IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/eeupol/v3y2002i3p267-295.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Structural Conditions and the Propensity for Regional Integration

Author

Listed:
  • Brian Efird

    (Decision Insights, Inc., USA be@diiusa.com)

  • Gaspare M. Genna

    (Winona State University, USA g.genna@winona.edu)

Abstract

This paper proposes a theory for regional integration based on structural conditions. By applying power transition theory, we are able to account for and anticipate not only the tendency for pairs of countries to participate in integration, but the likely intensity of such integration as well. We find that integration is most likely when there is an asymmetric distribution of power between countries and when they are jointly satisfied after a power transition has occurred. These results hold even after controlling for level of development and trade flows. We test this theory on all politically relevant dyads between 1950 and 1996 using a novel method to measure the level of regional integration. We illustrate the empirical findings through simulations that track the developments leading to Europe's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

Suggested Citation

  • Brian Efird & Gaspare M. Genna, 2002. "Structural Conditions and the Propensity for Regional Integration," European Union Politics, , vol. 3(3), pages 267-295, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:3:y:2002:i:3:p:267-295
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116502003003001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1465116502003003001
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/1465116502003003001?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tsoukalis, Loukas, 1997. "The New European Economy Revisited," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198774778.
    2. Mansfield, Edward D. & Pevehouse, Jon C., 2000. "Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 775-808, October.
    3. Beck, Nathaniel & Katz, Jonathan N., 1995. "What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(3), pages 634-647, September.
    4. Andrew Moravcsik, 1995. "Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Integration: A Rejoinder," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(4), pages 611-628, December.
    5. Levine, Ross & Renelt, David, 1992. "A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 942-963, September.
    6. Tsebelis, George & Garrett, Geoffrey, 2001. "The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(2), pages 357-390, April.
    7. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini & Gerald D. Cohen, 1997. "Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510944, April.
    8. Powell, Robert, 1996. "Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 749-764, December.
    9. Haas, Ernst B., 1961. "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 366-392, July.
    10. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, 1985. "The War Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected Utility Model," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(1), pages 156-177, March.
    11. Garrett, Geoffrey & Tsebelis, George, 1996. "An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism: erratum," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 539-539, July.
    12. Robert J. Barro, 1998. "Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522543, April.
    13. Garrett, Geoffrey & Tsebelis, George, 1996. "An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 269-299, April.
    14. Andrew Moravcsik, 1993. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 473-524, December.
    15. Organski, A.F.K. & Kugler, Jacek, 1977. "The Costs of Major Wars: The Phoenix Factor," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 1347-1366, December.
    16. Douglas Lemke & William Reed, 1996. "Regime types and status quo evaluations: Power transition theory and the democratic peace," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(2), pages 143-164, May.
    17. Pollack, Mark A., 1997. "Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(1), pages 99-134, January.
    18. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, 1994. "Western Hemisphere Economic Integration," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 75, January.
    19. Tsebelis, George, 1994. "The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(1), pages 128-142, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Libman, Alexander, 2009. "Russian federalism and post-Soviet integration: Divergence of development paths," MPRA Paper 12944, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Susanne K. Schmidt, 2000. "Only an Agenda Setter?," European Union Politics, , vol. 1(1), pages 37-61, February.
    2. Thomas König & Thomas Bräuninger, 1998. "The Inclusiveness of European Decision Rules," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(1), pages 125-142, January.
    3. Thomas Doleys, 2009. "Incomplete Contracting, Commission Discretion and the Origins of EU Merger Control," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 483-506, June.
    4. Thomas Konig & Jonathan Slapin, 2004. "Bringing Parliaments Back in," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(3), pages 357-394, July.
    5. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:47:y:2009:i::p:483-506 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Jean-Yves Pitarakis & George Tridimas, 2003. "Joint Dynamics of Legal and Economic Integration in the European Union," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 357-368, November.
    7. Benczes, István, 2018. "Az euróövezet válságrendezése a liberális kormányköziség elméletének értelmezésében [Crisis management in the Euro Zone from the perspective of liberal inter-governmentalism]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 923-948.
    8. Tridimas, George & Tridimas, Takis, 2004. "National courts and the European Court of Justice: a public choice analysis of the preliminary reference procedure," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 125-145, June.
    9. Oliver Pamp, 2008. "Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions: Explaining Fiscal Retrenchment in the European Union," European Political Economy Review, European Political Economy Infrastructure Consortium, vol. 8(Spring), pages 4-39.
    10. John Coultrap, 1999. "From Parliamentarism to Pluralism," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(1), pages 107-135, January.
    11. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:47:y:2009:i::p:357-384 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Madeleine O. Hosli & Běla Plechanovová & Serguei Kaniovski, 2018. "Vote Probabilities, Thresholds and Actor Preferences: Decision Capacity and the Council of the European Union," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 31-52, June.
    13. Jonathan B Slapin, 2013. "Response to Franchino," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(2), pages 338-341, June.
    14. Oliver Pamp, 2004. "Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions: Explaining Fiscal Retrenchment in the European Union," Eastward Enlargement of the Euro-zone Working Papers wp24, Free University Berlin, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, revised 15 Oct 2004.
    15. George Tsebelis & Geoffrey Garrett, 2000. "Legislative Politics in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 1(1), pages 9-36, February.
    16. Geoffrey Garrett & George Tsebelis, 1999. "Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 291-308, July.
    17. Bernard Steunenberg & Dieter Schmidtchen & Christian Koboldt, 1999. "Strategic Power in the European Union," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 339-366, July.
    18. Robert Pahre & Burcu Uçaray‐Mangitli, 2009. "The Myths of Turkish Influence in the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(2), pages 357-384, March.
    19. Geoffrey Garrett & George Tsebelis & Richard Corbett, 2001. "The EU Legislative Process," European Union Politics, , vol. 2(3), pages 353-366, October.
    20. Keith Dowding, 2000. "Institutionalist Research on the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 1(1), pages 125-144, February.
    21. Geoffrey Garrett & George Tsebelis, 1999. "More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the European Union," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 331-338, July.
    22. Mareike Kleine, 2013. "Trading Control: National Chiefdoms within International Organizations," LEQS – LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series 59, European Institute, LSE.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:3:y:2002:i:3:p:267-295. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.