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Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War

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  • Huth, Paul K.

Abstract

Successful deterrence, it is argued, requires a combination of military capabilities and bargaining behavior that enhances a defender's credibility without provoking a potential attacker. Hypotheses on the political and military conditions under which extended-immediate deterrence is likely to succeed or fail are formulated and tested by probit analysis on fifty-eight historical cases. The empirical results indicate that (1) the military capability of the defender to deny the potential attacker a quick and decisive victory on the battlefield enhances deterrence; (2) a policy of reciprocity in diplomacy and military actions by the defender contributes strongly to deterrence success; and (3) a past record of backing down under pressure or intransigence in confrontations with the potential attacker increases the likelihood of deterrence failure.

Suggested Citation

  • Huth, Paul K., 1988. "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 423-443, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:82:y:1988:i:02:p:423-443_08
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    Cited by:

    1. Thorin M. Wright & Toby J. Rider, 2014. "Disputed territory, defensive alliances and conflict initiation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(2), pages 119-144, April.
    2. Catherine C. Langlois, 2012. "Power and Deterrence in Alliance Relationships," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(2), pages 148-169, April.
    3. Paul Poast, 2013. "Issue linkage and international cooperation: An empirical investigation," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 30(3), pages 286-303, July.
    4. Brian Benjamin Crisher, 2014. "Inequality Amid Equality: Military Capabilities and Conflict Behavior in Balanced Dyads," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(2), pages 246-269, March.
    5. Klaus Abbink & Lu Dong & Lingbo Huang, 2021. "Arms Races and Conflict: Experimental Evidence," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(637), pages 1883-1904.
    6. James Meernik, 1999. "Force and Influence in International Crises," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 17(1), pages 103-131, February.
    7. Ross A. Miller, 1999. "Regime Type, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Use of Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 43(3), pages 388-402, June.
    8. Samuel S. G. Wu, 1990. "To Attack or Not to Attack," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(3), pages 531-552, September.
    9. Daniel S. Geller, 1990. "Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(2), pages 291-310, June.
    10. Kyle Beardsley & Victor Asal, 2009. "Winning with the Bomb," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(2), pages 278-301, April.
    11. Alexander H. Montgomery & Scott D. Sagan, 2009. "The Perils of Predicting Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(2), pages 302-328, April.
    12. James H. Lebovic, 2002. "The Law of Small Numbers," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(4), pages 455-483, August.
    13. John Tyson Chatagnier, 2015. "Conflict bargaining as a signal to third parties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(2), pages 237-268, April.

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