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The Employment Effects of a “Good Cause†Discharge Standard in Montana

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  • Bradley T. Ewing
  • Charles M. North
  • Beck A. Taylor

Abstract

With passage of a 1987 statute, Montana became the only state to adopt a “good cause†standard for discharge of employees with contracts of unspecified duration. The new statute was a legislative response to a series of Montana Supreme Court cases, starting in 1980, that gave otherwise at-will employees a broad right to sue for wrongful discharge. Estimating a policy intervention model using monthly time-series data on Montana employment, the authors find that the seminal Montana wrongful discharge case reduced annual employment growth in Montana by 0.46 percentage points, and that the “good cause†statute restored the original growth rate. While the firing costs literature would suggest that employment should fall following implementation of a heightened discharge standard, the contrary result in Montana is likely due to important procedural and other limitations imposed by the new statute on discharged employees' legal recourse.

Suggested Citation

  • Bradley T. Ewing & Charles M. North & Beck A. Taylor, 2005. "The Employment Effects of a “Good Cause†Discharge Standard in Montana," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 59(1), pages 17-33, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:59:y:2005:i:1:p:17-33
    DOI: 10.1177/001979390505900102
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Miles, Thomas J, 2000. "Common Law Exceptions to Employment at Will and U.S. Labor Markets," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 74-101, April.
    2. Barry T. Hirsch & David A. MacPherson, 2003. "Union Membership and Coverage Database from the Current Population Survey: Note," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 56(2), pages 349-354, January.
    3. David H. Autor, 2003. "Outsourcing at Will: The Contribution of Unjust Dismissal Doctrine to the Growth of Employment Outsourcing," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 1-42, January.
    4. Max Schanzenbach, 2003. "Exceptions to Employment at Will: Raising Firing Costs or Enforcing Life-Cycle Contracts?," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 5(2), pages 470-504, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Camille Signoretto, 2013. "Rupture conventionnelle, destructions d'emplois et licenciements : une analyse empirique sur données d'entreprises (2006-2009)," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13069, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.

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