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Grievance Procedure Strength and Teacher Quits

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  • Daniel I. Rees

Abstract

Freeman's exit-voice model of unionism suggests that grievance procedure strength should be negatively related to the probability that an employee quits his or her job. In this study, which uses data on New York State public school teachers and districts from the mid-1970s, it is found that teachers with the two strongest types of grievance procedures in their contracts had a lower probability of quitting than those working under weaker grievance procedures. The author views this result as evidence that unionization can reduce quits through a “voice†effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel I. Rees, 1991. "Grievance Procedure Strength and Teacher Quits," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 45(1), pages 31-43, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:45:y:1991:i:1:p:31-43
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    Cited by:

    1. Marianno, Bradley D. & Strunk, Katharine O., 2018. "The bad end of the bargain?: Revisiting the relationship between collective bargaining agreements and student achievement," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 93-106.
    2. Brewer, Dominic J, 1996. "Career Paths and Quit Decisions: Evidence from Teaching," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(2), pages 313-339, April.
    3. Michael David Maffie, 2023. "Becoming a pirate: Independence as an alternative to exit in the gig economy," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 61(1), pages 46-67, March.
    4. Duplantis, Malcolm M. & Chandler, Timothy D. & Geske, Terry G., 1995. "The growth and impact of teachers' unions in states without collective bargaining legislation," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 167-178, June.

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