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Taming the Tides of Internal Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of Political Institutions and Natural Resources

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  • Ly Slesman
  • Ali Kole
  • Rizgar Abdlkarim Abdlaziz
  • Ibrahim D. Raheem

Abstract

This article examines the interaction effects of resource rents and political institutions on internal conflicts in a panel of 29 Sub-Sahara African countries from 1983 to 2018. Relying on the system generalized method of moments (SGMM) estimator that controls for instrument proliferation, we find robust evidence of the adverse interaction effects between resource rents and political institutions on internal conflicts. Comprehensive marginal effect analysis on both variables reveals the following significant findings. First, there is a (broad) U-shaped marginal effect of resource rents and political institutions. Second, when each component of resource rents was analyzed, only oil and mineral rents had a negative and statistically significant interaction effect with political institutions on internal conflicts. The U-shaped marginal effects hold only for oil rents (but become narrower), while mineral rents exhibit only an L-shaped marginal effect at low levels of political institutions. Our findings are robust to a broad set of alternative measures of political institutions and alternative specifications of the interaction term. JEL Classification Q34, E02, N57

Suggested Citation

  • Ly Slesman & Ali Kole & Rizgar Abdlkarim Abdlaziz & Ibrahim D. Raheem, 2024. "Taming the Tides of Internal Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of Political Institutions and Natural Resources," Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies, Emerging Markets Forum, vol. 16(2), pages 188-211, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:emeeco:v:16:y:2024:i:2:p:188-211
    DOI: 10.1177/09749101231187468
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic panel model; internal conflicts; natural resource rents; political institutions; sub-Sahara African countries;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • N57 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Africa; Oceania

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