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Divided Government and International Cooperation in Austria-Hungary, Sweden-Norway and the European Union

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  • Robert Pahre

    (Department of Political Science, University of Illinois, USA)

Abstract

A growing consensus maintains that divided government makes international cooperation more difficult. This paper takes issue with this claim. While divided government does make treaty ratification more difficult, it also affects the outcome when cooperation breaks down. To understand this effect of divided government, I bring the reversion point into the heart of the analysis of cooperation. If divided government makes this reversion point more unattractive than the reversion point under unified government, it may make cooperation more likely. Divided government also varies in ways previously overlooked in the literature, most importantly in whether the negotiator or ratifier controls the reversion point (or status quo). I test these claims against three supranational polities, the dual monarchies of Austria-Hungary and Sweden-Norway and the European Union today.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Pahre, 2001. "Divided Government and International Cooperation in Austria-Hungary, Sweden-Norway and the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 2(2), pages 131-162, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:2:y:2001:i:2:p:131-162
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116501002002001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jacob Wood & Gohar Feroz Khan, 2015. "International trade negotiation analysis: network and semantic knowledge infrastructure," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 105(1), pages 537-556, October.

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