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Ministerial bureaucracies as stand-in agenda setters? A comparative description

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  • Schnapp, Kai-Uwe

Abstract

This paper sets out to theoretically conceptualise and empirically describe the potential ability of ministerial bureaucracies to influence policy-making. The theoretical framework describes the chances for bureaucracies to influence policymaking as accruing from three sources: the organisational structures of the bureaucracy itself, room for bureaucratic discretion resulting from the preference configurations of the political actors, and the chance for the bureaucracy to act as political agenda setter rather than politicians. A quantitative empirical description of 21 OECD-countries is presented with the aim of comparing the relative strengths of the national ministerial bureaucracies. The paper concludes with an empirical classification of administrative systems. Japan, Belgium, and Ireland are found to be countries with a strong position for the bureaucracy in all of the theoretically described dimensions. The opposite end of the spectrum is marked by New Zealand, where the bureaucracy appears to be comparatively weak.

Suggested Citation

  • Schnapp, Kai-Uwe, 2000. "Ministerial bureaucracies as stand-in agenda setters? A comparative description," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Institutions and Social Change FS III 00-204, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbisc:fsiii00204
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