IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jothpo/v18y2006i3p267-297.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Dyadic Myth and Monadic Advantage

Author

Listed:
  • Xinyuan Dai

    (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Department of Political Sciences, 361 Lincoln Hall, 702 South Wright Street, MC-452, Urbana, IL 61801-3696 xdai@uiuc.edu)

Abstract

How do democratic institutions influence international trade policy? This article highlights conceptual challenges confronting the study of democracy and trade. Using a game theoretic model, I aim to spell out the precise effect of democratic legislative constraints on trade. In contrast to the dyadic argument that legislative constraints enable democracies to better cooperate with each other to liberalize trade, I argue that effective legislative constraints give a democracy a monadic bargaining advantage in international trade negotiations. This advantage is associated with a lower level of trade barriers abroad and a higher level of trade barriers at home. Thus, rather than dyadically cooperative, a democracy may be monadically competitive.

Suggested Citation

  • Xinyuan Dai, 2006. "Dyadic Myth and Monadic Advantage," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 18(3), pages 267-297, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:18:y:2006:i:3:p:267-297
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629806064348
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951629806064348
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0951629806064348?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Edward D. Mansfield & Helen V. Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff, 2015. "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Edward D Mansfield (ed.), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, chapter 7, pages 127-143, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Mertha, Andrew & Pahre, Robert, 2005. "Patently Misleading: Partial Implementation and Bargaining Leverage in Sino-American Negotiations on Intellectual Property Rights," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 695-729, July.
    3. Lohmann, Susanne & O'Halloran, Sharyn, 1994. "Divided government and U.S. trade policy: theory and evidence," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(4), pages 595-632, October.
    4. Lohmann, Susanne, 1993. "Electoral cycles and international policy cooperation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(7), pages 1373-1391, October.
    5. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(3), pages 427-460, July.
    6. Simmons, Beth A., 2000. "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(4), pages 819-835, December.
    7. Hug, Simon & König, Thomas, 2002. "In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 447-476, April.
    8. Oneal, John R. & Russett, Bruce, 2001. "Clear and Clean: The Fixed Effects of the Liberal Peace," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(2), pages 469-485, April.
    9. repec:cup:apsrev:v:96:y:2002:i:01:p:159-165_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Mayer, Frederick W., 1992. "Managing domestic differences in international negotiations: the strategic use of internal side-payments," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(4), pages 793-818, October.
    11. Mo, Jongryn, 1995. "Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(4), pages 914-924, December.
    12. Helen V. Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff, 1996. "Trade Negotiations, Information And Domestic Politics: The Role Of Domestic Groups," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(2), pages 145-189, July.
    13. Rogowski, Ronald, 1987. "Trade and the variety of democratic institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 203-223, April.
    14. Schultz, Kenneth A., 1998. "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(4), pages 829-844, December.
    15. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno & Morrow, James D. & Siverson, Randolph M. & Smith, Alastair, 1999. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 791-807, December.
    16. Iida, Keisuke, 1996. "Involuntary Defection in Two-Level Games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 89(3-4), pages 283-303, December.
    17. Scott D. Bennett & Allan C. Stam III, 1998. "The Declining Advantages of Democracy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(3), pages 344-366, June.
    18. Morrow, James D., 1994. "Modeling the forms of international cooperation: distribution versus information," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 387-423, July.
    19. Fearon, James D., 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(3), pages 577-592, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Thomas Konig & Jonathan Slapin, 2004. "Bringing Parliaments Back in," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(3), pages 357-394, July.
    2. Barbara Dluhosch & Nikolai Ziegler, 2011. "The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 325-354, December.
    3. Ana Carolina Garriga, 2009. "Regime Type and Bilateral Treaty Formalization," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(5), pages 698-726, October.
    4. Simon Hug & Tobias Schulz, 2007. "Referendums in the EU’s constitution building process," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 177-218, June.
    5. Johannes Urpelainen, 2011. "Early birds: Special interests and the strategic logic of international cooperation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 113-140, July.
    6. Fiona McGillivray & Alastair Smith, 2005. "The Impact of Leadership Turnover and Domestic Institutions on International Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 49(5), pages 639-660, October.
    7. Christopher K. Butler, 2004. "Modeling Compromise at the International Table," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(3), pages 159-177, July.
    8. Christopher Gelpi & Joseph M. Grieco, 2001. "Attracting Trouble," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(6), pages 794-817, December.
    9. Conconi, Paola & Sahuguet, Nicolas & Zanardi, Maurizio, 2018. "Electoral incentives, term limits, and the sustainability of peace," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 15-26.
    10. Terrence L. Chapman, 2007. "International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and Institutional Legitimacy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(1), pages 134-166, February.
    11. Nakao, Keisuke, 2022. "Democratic Victory and War Duration: Why Are Democracies Less Likely to Win Long Wars?," MPRA Paper 112849, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Xinyuan Dai, 2006. "The Conditional Nature of Democratic Compliance," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(5), pages 690-713, October.
    13. Han Dorussen & Jongryn Mo, 2001. "Ending Economic Sanctions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(4), pages 395-426, August.
    14. Susan Hannah Allen, 2007. "Time Bombs," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(1), pages 112-133, February.
    15. David Brulé, 2006. "Congressional Opposition, the Economy, and U.S. Dispute Initiation, 1946-2000," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(4), pages 463-483, August.
    16. Robert Pahre, 2001. "Divided Government and International Cooperation in Austria-Hungary, Sweden-Norway and the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 2(2), pages 131-162, June.
    17. David Tingle, 2015. "Bargaining Practice and Negotiation Failure in Russia-Ukraine Gas Relations," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1504, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    18. Macartan Humphreys, 2007. "Strategic ratification," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 191-208, July.
    19. James Lee Ray, 2001. "Integrating Levels of Analysis in World Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 13(4), pages 355-388, October.
    20. Alastair Smith, 2009. "Political Groups, Leader Change, and the Pattern of International Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(6), pages 853-877, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:18:y:2006:i:3:p:267-297. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.