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Analyzing inter-state negotiations in the Eurozone crisis and beyond

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  • Jeffry Frieden
  • Stefanie Walter

Abstract

Analyzing international negotiations among the member states of the European Union raises a number of analytical issues, especially in unusual circumstances such as the Eurozone crisis. Our article discusses these issues in the light of existing theory and informed by the empirical analyses assembled in this special issue. ‘National preferences’ or ideal points of the governments involved are driven by their domestic socio-economic and political conditions and institutions, the dimensionality of the negotiations, and strategic considerations. We then discuss how national preferences, states’ bargaining power, the strategic and institutional bargaining context, and the bargaining dynamics jointly influence the bargaining outcome. Examples from European negotiations in the context of the Eurozone crisis illustrate both the complexity of the process and the value of serious, theoretically informed, empirical analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffry Frieden & Stefanie Walter, 2019. "Analyzing inter-state negotiations in the Eurozone crisis and beyond," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 134-151, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:20:y:2019:i:1:p:134-151
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116518813450
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Fabio Wasserfallen & Dirk Leuffen & Zdenek Kudrna & Hanno Degner, 2019. "Analysing European Union decision-making during the Eurozone crisis with new data," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 3-23, March.
    3. Sebastian Blesse & Pierre C Boyer & Friedrich Heinemann & Eckhard Janeba & Anasuya Raj, 2019. "European Monetary Union reform preferences of French and German parliamentarians," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(3), pages 406-424, September.

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