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One Europe, One Vote?

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  • Jeffry A. Frieden

Abstract

Many Europeans support common European Union (EU) representation in international institutions. But such a pooling of international political influence raises complex and controversial issues. A common European foreign policy position implies compromise among EU members. The pooling of international representation thus requires, as with many internal EU policies, that member states weigh the potential benefits of a common policy against the potential costs of a policy not to their liking. There can be a tradeoff between the advantages of scale and the disadvantages of overriding heterogeneous preferences. Simple spatial models help to make this point, to clarify the circumstances in which a common European international representation is most likely, and to explain who is most likely to support or oppose a pooling of European foreign policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffry A. Frieden, 2004. "One Europe, One Vote?," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(2), pages 261-276, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:5:y:2004:i:2:p:261-276
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116504042441
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    1. Géraldine Mahieu & Dirk Ooms & Stéphane Rottier, 2005. "Forum Section: EU Representation and the Governance of the International Monetary Fund," European Union Politics, , vol. 6(4), pages 493-510, December.
    2. Christian B. Jensen & Jonathan Slapin & Thomas König, 2007. "Who Calls for a Common EU Foreign Policy?," European Union Politics, , vol. 8(3), pages 387-410, September.
    3. Tom Delreux, 2006. "The European Union in international environmental negotiations: a legal perspective on the internal decision-making process," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 231-248, September.
    4. Jeffry Frieden & Stefanie Walter, 2019. "Analyzing inter-state negotiations in the Eurozone crisis and beyond," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 134-151, March.
    5. Mona Lyne & Daniel Nielson & Michael Tierney, 2009. "Controlling coalitions: Social lending at the multilateral development banks," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 407-433, December.
    6. Tokhi, Alexandros, 2022. "International organizations, European Union access, and authority," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 44(5), pages 617-634.
    7. Fatih Demir, 2021. "Public Management Reforms In Turkey," Public administration issues, Higher School of Economics, issue 6, pages 63-83.
    8. Fabio Wasserfallen, 2014. "Political and Economic Integration in the EU: The Case of Failed Tax Harmonization," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 420-435, March.

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