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Bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone

Author

Listed:
  • Magnus Lundgren
  • Stefanie Bailer
  • Lisa M Dellmuth
  • Jonas Tallberg
  • Silvana Târlea

Abstract

This article provides a systematic assessment of bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone 2010 to 2015. Theoretically, we develop an argument about preferences and institutions as determinants of bargaining success and contrast this argument with an alternative account privileging states’ power resources. Empirically, we conduct a statistical analysis of new data covering all key reform proposals. Our findings are three-fold. First, contrary to a conventional narrative of German dominance, the negotiations produced no clear winners and losers. Second, while power resources were of limited importance, holding preferences that were centrist or close to the European Commission favored bargaining success—particularly when adoption only required the support of a qualified majority. Third, these descriptive and explanatory results reflect dynamics of compromise and reciprocity.

Suggested Citation

  • Magnus Lundgren & Stefanie Bailer & Lisa M Dellmuth & Jonas Tallberg & Silvana Târlea, 2019. "Bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 65-88, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:20:y:2019:i:1:p:65-88
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116518811073
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Lehner & Fabio Wasserfallen, 2019. "Political conflict in the reform of the Eurozone," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 45-64, March.
    2. Joshua C Fjelstul, 2022. "Explaining public opinion on the enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact during the European sovereign debt crisis," European Union Politics, , vol. 23(2), pages 192-211, June.
    3. Jonas Tallberg & Magnus Lundgren & Johannes Geith, 2023. "AI Regulation in the European Union: Examining Non-State Actor Preferences," Papers 2305.11523, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    4. Fabio Franchino & Camilla Mariotto, 2021. "Noncompliance risk, asymmetric power and the design of enforcement of the European economic governance," European Union Politics, , vol. 22(4), pages 591-610, December.
    5. Fabio Wasserfallen & Dirk Leuffen & Zdenek Kudrna & Hanno Degner, 2019. "Analysing European Union decision-making during the Eurozone crisis with new data," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 3-23, March.
    6. Dermot Hodson, 2019. "The New Intergovernmentalism and the Euro Crisis: A Painful Case?," LEQS – LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series 145, European Institute, LSE.
    7. Christian Freudlsperger & Martin Weinrich, 2022. "Decentralized EU Policy Coordination in Crisis? The Case of Germany," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(5), pages 1356-1373, September.
    8. Jeffry Frieden & Stefanie Walter, 2019. "Analyzing inter-state negotiations in the Eurozone crisis and beyond," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 134-151, March.
    9. Daniel Finke & Stefanie Bailer, 2019. "Crisis bargaining in the European Union: Formal rules or market pressure?," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 109-133, March.
    10. Silvana Târlea & Stefanie Bailer & Hanno Degner & Lisa M Dellmuth & Dirk Leuffen & Magnus Lundgren & Jonas Tallberg & Fabio Wasserfallen, 2019. "Explaining governmental preferences on Economic and Monetary Union Reform," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 24-44, March.
    11. Hanno Degner & Dirk Leuffen, 2019. "Franco-German cooperation and the rescuing of the Eurozone," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 89-108, March.
    12. Philipp Broniecki, 2020. "Power and transparency in political negotiations," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(1), pages 109-129, March.

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