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Money Makes the EU Go Round: The Objective Foundations of Conflict in the Council of Ministers

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  • Stefanie Bailer
  • Mikko Mattila
  • Gerald Schneider

Abstract

Many examinations of the dimensions of conflict in the European Union Council of Ministers focus on the ideological roots of contestation in the EU. This article examines the extent to which structural attributes of the Member States explain the conflict within the Council of Ministers in general as well as in selected policy domains (agriculture, fisheries, environment, economic affairs). Drawing on the political economy literature of legislative decision-making, a multilevel analysis shows that country-level redistributive interests shape the interactions considerably and in some of the policy domains that are examined in more detail. The impact of ideological variables like the left-right positioning of the Member State governments remains inconsistent and marginal in this analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefanie Bailer & Mikko Mattila & Gerald Schneider, 2015. "Money Makes the EU Go Round: The Objective Foundations of Conflict in the Council of Ministers," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 437-456, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:53:y:2015:i:3:p:437-456
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    References listed on IDEAS

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