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Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North Korea

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  • Haggard, Stephan
  • Noland, Marcus

Abstract

In this volume, we draw on a growing theoretical and empirical literature on economic statecraft to connect marketization processes, changing foreign economic relations and the strategic interplay around the North Korea’s nuclear program. The ultimate objective is not only to understand North Korea but to address the debate over the merits and demerits of “engagement” with adversaries. However, this manuscript is not simply about North Korea. It also seeks to address the broader theoretical and empirical question of how and whether “engagement” with adversaries—and economic engagement in particular--can mitigate security dilemmas, induce cooperation and even transform recalcitrant states.

Suggested Citation

  • Haggard, Stephan & Noland, Marcus, 2016. "Hard Target: Sanctions, Inducements, and the Case of North Korea," MPRA Paper 105812, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:105812
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Bulychev, G. & Yakovlev, A., 2023. "The potential of Russia-DPRK cooperation: economic advantages and political disadvantages," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 58(1), pages 172-181.
    4. Attia, Hana & Grauvogel, Julia & von Soest, Christian, 2020. "The termination of international sanctions: explaining target compliance and sender capitulation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    sanctions; engagement; North Korea; nuclear weapons;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • P2 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P3 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions
    • P33 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - International Trade, Finance, Investment, Relations, and Aid
    • P37 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal

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