IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/eeupol/v20y2019i1p24-44.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Explaining governmental preferences on Economic and Monetary Union Reform

Author

Listed:
  • Silvana Târlea
  • Stefanie Bailer
  • Hanno Degner
  • Lisa M Dellmuth
  • Dirk Leuffen
  • Magnus Lundgren
  • Jonas Tallberg
  • Fabio Wasserfallen

Abstract

This article examines the extent to which economic or political factors shaped government preferences in the reform of the Economic Monetary Union. A multilevel analysis of European Union member governments’ preferences on 40 EMU reform issues negotiated between 2010 and 2015 suggests that countries’ financial sector exposure has significant explanatory power. Seeking to minimize the risk of costly bailouts, countries with highly exposed financial sectors were more likely to support solutions involving high degrees of European integration. In contrast, political factors had no systematic impact. These findings help to enhance our understanding of preference formation in the European Union and the viability of future EMU reform.

Suggested Citation

  • Silvana Târlea & Stefanie Bailer & Hanno Degner & Lisa M Dellmuth & Dirk Leuffen & Magnus Lundgren & Jonas Tallberg & Fabio Wasserfallen, 2019. "Explaining governmental preferences on Economic and Monetary Union Reform," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 24-44, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:20:y:2019:i:1:p:24-44
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116518814336
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1465116518814336
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/1465116518814336?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daniel Finke & Stefanie Bailer, 2019. "Crisis bargaining in the European Union: Formal rules or market pressure?," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 109-133, March.
    2. Christina Zimmer & Gerald Schneider & Michael Dobbins, 2005. "The Contested Council: Conflict Dimensions of an Intergovernmental EU Institution," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 53, pages 403-422, June.
    3. Stefanie Bailer & Mikko Mattila & Gerald Schneider, 2015. "Money Makes the EU Go Round: The Objective Foundations of Conflict in the Council of Ministers," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 437-456, May.
    4. Hooghe, Liesbet & Marks, Gary, 2009. "A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(1), pages 1-23, January.
    5. Fabio Wasserfallen & Dirk Leuffen & Zdenek Kudrna & Hanno Degner, 2019. "Analysing European Union decision-making during the Eurozone crisis with new data," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 3-23, March.
    6. Hobolt, Sara B. & Wratil, Christopher, 2015. "Public opinion and the crisis: the dynamics of support for the euro," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 60788, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Thomas Lehner & Fabio Wasserfallen, 2019. "Political conflict in the reform of the Eurozone," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 45-64, March.
    8. Pieter De Wilde & Michael Zürn, 2012. "Can the Politicization of European Integration be Reversed?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(S1), pages 137-153, March.
    9. Dani Rodrik, 1998. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(5), pages 997-1032, October.
    10. Magnus Lundgren & Stefanie Bailer & Lisa M Dellmuth & Jonas Tallberg & Silvana Târlea, 2019. "Bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 65-88, March.
    11. Frieden, Jeffry A., 1991. "Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(4), pages 425-451, October.
    12. Fabio Wasserfallen, 2014. "Political and Economic Integration in the EU: The Case of Failed Tax Harmonization," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 420-435, March.
    13. Hanno Degner & Dirk Leuffen, 2019. "Franco-German cooperation and the rescuing of the Eurozone," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 89-108, March.
    14. Moravcsik, Andrew, 1997. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(4), pages 513-553, October.
    15. Sofia Vasilopoulou & Daphne Halikiopoulou & Theofanis Exadaktylos, 2014. "Greece in Crisis: Austerity, Populism and the Politics of Blame," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 388-402, March.
    16. Christina Zimmer & Gerald Schneider & Michael Dobbins, 2005. "The Contested Council: Conflict Dimensions of an Intergovernmental EU Institution," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 53(2), pages 403-422, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Joshua C Fjelstul, 2022. "Explaining public opinion on the enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact during the European sovereign debt crisis," European Union Politics, , vol. 23(2), pages 192-211, June.
    2. Fabio Wasserfallen & Dirk Leuffen & Zdenek Kudrna & Hanno Degner, 2019. "Analysing European Union decision-making during the Eurozone crisis with new data," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 3-23, March.
    3. Jeffry Frieden & Stefanie Walter, 2019. "Analyzing inter-state negotiations in the Eurozone crisis and beyond," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 134-151, March.
    4. Daniel Finke & Stefanie Bailer, 2019. "Crisis bargaining in the European Union: Formal rules or market pressure?," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 109-133, March.
    5. Thomas Lehner & Fabio Wasserfallen, 2019. "Political conflict in the reform of the Eurozone," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 45-64, March.
    6. Magnus Lundgren & Stefanie Bailer & Lisa M Dellmuth & Jonas Tallberg & Silvana Târlea, 2019. "Bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 65-88, March.
    7. Lindner, Vincent & Eckert, Sandra & Nölke, Andreas, 2022. "Political science research on the reasons for the (non) adoption and (non) implementation of EMU reform proposals: The state of the art," SAFE Working Paper Series 339, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    8. Fabio Franchino & Camilla Mariotto, 2021. "Noncompliance risk, asymmetric power and the design of enforcement of the European economic governance," European Union Politics, , vol. 22(4), pages 591-610, December.
    9. Menna Bizuneh & Steven Buigut & Neven Valev, 2020. "Beyond Borders: The Euro Crisis and Public Support for Monetary Integration in East Africa," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 88(4), pages 518-535, December.
    10. Hanno Degner & Dirk Leuffen, 2019. "Franco-German cooperation and the rescuing of the Eurozone," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 89-108, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jeffry Frieden & Stefanie Walter, 2019. "Analyzing inter-state negotiations in the Eurozone crisis and beyond," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 134-151, March.
    2. Brigitte Pircher & Mike Farjam, 2021. "Oppositional voting in the Council of the EU between 2010 and 2019: Evidence for differentiated politicisation," European Union Politics, , vol. 22(3), pages 472-494, September.
    3. Thomas Lehner & Fabio Wasserfallen, 2019. "Political conflict in the reform of the Eurozone," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 45-64, March.
    4. Markus Gastinger, 2021. "Introducing the EU exit index measuring each member state’s propensity to leave the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 22(3), pages 566-585, September.
    5. Fabio Franchino & Camilla Mariotto, 2021. "Noncompliance risk, asymmetric power and the design of enforcement of the European economic governance," European Union Politics, , vol. 22(4), pages 591-610, December.
    6. Tanja A. Börzel & Philipp Broniecki & Miriam Hartlapp & Lukas Obholzer, 2023. "Contesting Europe: Eurosceptic Dissent and Integration Polarization in the European Parliament," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(4), pages 1100-1118, July.
    7. Daniel Finke & Stefanie Bailer, 2019. "Crisis bargaining in the European Union: Formal rules or market pressure?," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 109-133, March.
    8. Christopher Wratil & Sara B Hobolt, 2019. "Public deliberations in the Council of the European Union: Introducing and validating DICEU," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(3), pages 511-531, September.
    9. Fabio Wasserfallen & Dirk Leuffen & Zdenek Kudrna & Hanno Degner, 2019. "Analysing European Union decision-making during the Eurozone crisis with new data," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 3-23, March.
    10. Anna-Lena Högenauer, 2021. "Scrutiny or Complacency? Banking Union in the Bundestag and the Assemblée Nationale," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 9(2), pages 219-229.
    11. Joshua C Fjelstul, 2022. "Explaining public opinion on the enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact during the European sovereign debt crisis," European Union Politics, , vol. 23(2), pages 192-211, June.
    12. Federica Genovese & Gerald Schneider, 2020. "Smoke with fire: Financial crises and the demand for parliamentary oversight in the European Union," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 633-665, July.
    13. Manuele Citi & Mads Dagnis Jensen, 2022. "The Effects of Supranational Delegation on Policy Development," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 337-354, March.
    14. Bes, Bart Joachim & Schoonvelde, Martijn & Rauh, Christian, 2020. "Undermining, defusing or defending European integration? Assessing public communication of European executives in times of EU politicisation," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 59(2), pages 397-423.
    15. M. H. Austgulen, 2020. "Understanding National Preferences in EU Consumer Policy: A Regime Approach," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 43(4), pages 767-798, December.
    16. Baccaro, Lucio & Bremer, Björn & Neimanns, Erik, 2020. "Is the euro up for grabs? Evidence from a survey experiment," MPIfG Discussion Paper 20/10, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    17. Christopher Wratil, 2018. "Modes of government responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence from Council negotiation positions," European Union Politics, , vol. 19(1), pages 52-74, March.
    18. Magnus Lundgren & Stefanie Bailer & Lisa M Dellmuth & Jonas Tallberg & Silvana Târlea, 2019. "Bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 65-88, March.
    19. Mónica D. Oliveira & Inês Mataloto & Panos Kanavos, 2019. "Multi-criteria decision analysis for health technology assessment: addressing methodological challenges to improve the state of the art," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 20(6), pages 891-918, August.
    20. Austė Vaznonytė, 2020. "The rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU – Still an agenda-setter?," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(3), pages 497-518, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:20:y:2019:i:1:p:24-44. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.