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Choosing an informative agenda setter: The appointment of the Commission in the European Union

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  • Christophe Crombez
  • Martijn Huysmans
  • Wim Van Gestel

Abstract

We present a game-theoretical analysis of Commission appointment in the European Union. In the model, the European Parliament and the member states look ahead and consider the outcomes that result from the appointment of alternative Commissions. In contrast to earlier work, we assume the European Parliament and the member states have incomplete information on the consequences of policies, whereas the Commission acquires private information. We find that the increased use of codecision gives the Council an incentive to appoint a Commission that is closer to the European Parliament, because the European Parliament then trusts the Commission more and the Commission is more informative as a result. Thus, we shed new light on the Spitzenkandidaten Coup that preceded the appointment of the Juncker Commission.

Suggested Citation

  • Christophe Crombez & Martijn Huysmans & Wim Van Gestel, 2017. "Choosing an informative agenda setter: The appointment of the Commission in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 18(2), pages 145-167, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:18:y:2017:i:2:p:145-167
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116516688102
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    References listed on IDEAS

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