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Who Has Power in the EU? The Commission, Council and Parliament in Legislative Decision‐making

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  • ROBERT THOMSON
  • MADELEINE HOSLI

Abstract

What is the relative power of the European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament (EP) in the European Union (EU)? Both scholars and practitioners of EU affairs provide different answers to this seemingly straightforward question. In this article, we examine the balance of power among these three actors in the context of legislative decision‐making. We report the results of a small survey among a select group of practitioners of EU affairs. Their judgements on the relative power of the three organizations vary considerably. We distinguish between two contrasting views: a Council‐centric view that attributes more power to the Council of Ministers than to the Commission and Parliament, and a supranational view that attributes large amounts of power to the supranational organizations relative to the Council. To test the veracity of these alternative views, we incorporate them into two variants of a simple and testable bargaining model that makes forecasts of decision outcomes, based on information on actors' preferences. The models are then applied to a dataset that includes information on EU actors' policy positions on 162 controversial issues of which the decision outcomes are known. The variant of the bargaining model incorporating the Council‐centric view provides significantly more accurate forecasts.

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  • Robert Thomson & Madeleine Hosli, 2006. "Who Has Power in the EU? The Commission, Council and Parliament in Legislative Decision‐making," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 391-417, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:44:y:2006:i:2:p:391-417
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2006.00628.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Buket Oztas & Amie Kreppel, 2022. "Power or Luck? The Limitations of the European Commission's Agenda Setting Power and Autonomous Policy Influence," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 408-426, March.
    2. Jonathan B Slapin, 2014. "Measurement, model testing, and legislative influence in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 15(1), pages 24-42, March.
    3. Bürgin, Alexander, 2013. "Salience, path dependency and the coalition between the European Commission and the Danish Council Presidency: Why the EU opened a visa liberalisation process with Turkey," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 17, August.
    4. Angela Tacea, 2021. "A New Research Agenda: How European Institutions Influence Law-Making in Justice and Home Affairs," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 9(3), pages 5-15.
    5. Petia Kostadinova & Magda Giurcanu, 2018. "Capturing the legislative priorities of transnational Europarties and the European Commission: A pledge approach," European Union Politics, , vol. 19(2), pages 363-379, June.
    6. Thomas König & Dirk Junge, 2009. "Why Don’t Veto Players Use Their Power?," European Union Politics, , vol. 10(4), pages 507-534, December.
    7. Christophe Crombez & Martijn Huysmans & Wim Van Gestel, 2017. "Choosing an informative agenda setter: The appointment of the Commission in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 18(2), pages 145-167, June.
    8. John A. Scherpereel & Lauren K. Perez, 2015. "Turnover in the Council of the European Union: What It is and Why It Matters," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 658-673, May.
    9. Thomas Laloux, 2024. "The effect of trilogues on the European Commission's success in legislative negotiations: A reappraisal," European Union Politics, , vol. 25(2), pages 440-455, June.
    10. van Gruisen, Philippe & Crombez, Christophe, 2021. "The Commission and the Council Presidency in the European Union: Strategic interactions and legislative powers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    11. Madeleine O. Hosli & Běla Plechanovová & Serguei Kaniovski, 2018. "Vote Probabilities, Thresholds and Actor Preferences: Decision Capacity and the Council of the European Union," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 31-52, June.
    12. Brandsma, Gijs Jan, 2013. "Bending the rules: Arrangements for sharing technical and political information between the EU institutions," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 17, July.
    13. Helene Dyrhauge, 2014. "The Road to Environmental Policy Integration is Paved with Obstacles: Intra- and Inter-Organizational Conflicts in EU Transport Decision-Making," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(5), pages 985-1001, September.
    14. Thomas Laloux & Lara Panning, 2021. "Why Defend Something I Don’t Agree with? Conflicts within the Commission and Legislative Amendments in Trilogues," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 9(3), pages 40-51.

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