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Delegation, Comitology, and the Separation of Powers in the European Union

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  • Ballmann, Alexander
  • Epstein, David
  • O'Halloran, Sharyn

Abstract

Although relatively unknown outside of Europe, comitology committees are an object of considerable controversy in the European Union (EU). Controversy stems from their pivotal role in overseeing policy implementation authority delegated from the Council of Ministers (Council) to the European Commission (Commission). In this article, we employ a game-theoretic model to analyze the influence of these, committees on policy outcomes. Our analysis provides three important insights. First, we show that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, comitology committees move outcomes toward the Commission's preferred policies rather than the Council's. Second, we demonstrate that the possibility of a Council veto may also move outcomes away from Council members' policy preferences and toward the Commission's. Third, the 1999 changes to the comitology procedures, designed to enhance the Commission's autonomy in policymaking, may have had the exact opposite effect. Paradoxically, we conclude that comitology serves to enhance the Commission's role in policy implementation and thereby strengthens the separation of powers within the EU.

Suggested Citation

  • Ballmann, Alexander & Epstein, David & O'Halloran, Sharyn, 2002. "Delegation, Comitology, and the Separation of Powers in the European Union," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(3), pages 551-574, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:56:y:2002:i:03:p:551-574_44
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    Cited by:

    1. Christophe Crombez & Martijn Huysmans & Wim Van Gestel, 2017. "Choosing an informative agenda setter: The appointment of the Commission in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 18(2), pages 145-167, June.
    2. Luthardt, Ulf & Zimmermann, Jochen, 2009. "A European view on the legitimacy of accounting procedures: Towards a deliberative-accountability framework for analysis," Research in Accounting Regulation, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 79-88.
    3. Yannis Karagiannis, 2007. "Foundational Economic Theories for Political-Scientific Inter-Branch Studies," RSCAS Working Papers 2007/16, European University Institute.
    4. Jens Blom‐Hansen & Gijs Jan Brandsma, 2009. "The EU Comitology System: Intergovernmental Bargaining and Deliberative Supranationalism?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(4), pages 719-740, September.
    5. Böhling, Kathrin, 2009. "Symbolic knowledge at work: Comitology and learning from experts in European technology policy [Symbolisches Wissen in der europäischen Technologiepolitik: Experten, Lernen und das Ausschusswesen]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Global Governance SP IV 2009-301, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    6. Yannis Karagiannis, 2007. "Economic Theories and the Science of Inter-Branch Relations," RSCAS Working Papers 2007/04, European University Institute.
    7. Ana Mar Fernández Pasarín & Nuria Font, 2022. "Unveiling Inconsistency: Consensus and Contestation along the Council–Comitology Cycle of EU Policy‐Making," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 427-444, March.

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