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Information problems and Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Author

Listed:
  • Işıl Ä°drisoÄŸlu

    (Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA)

  • William Spaniel

    (Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA)

Abstract

This paper explores the role of asymmetric information as a cause of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In the classic bargaining model of war, negotiations break down when one side privately believes that it is sufficiently more likely perform better in battle than the other side expects. There is strong evidence that this mechanism was at play on the eve of the invasion. Chronic problems with Russian civil–military institutions created both an army unprepared for the conflict and a lack of awareness of this within the Kremlin. In contrast, Ukraine had reports of these problems and also had private information regarding its own resolve. Consequently, the Kremlin's demands on the eve of the conflict exceeded what Ukraine was willing to concede. Russia invaded as a result.

Suggested Citation

  • Işıl Ä°drisoÄŸlu & William Spaniel, 2024. "Information problems and Russia's invasion of Ukraine," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(5), pages 514-533, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:41:y:2024:i:5:p:514-533
    DOI: 10.1177/07388942241238583
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    5. Sasha de Vogel & Jessica S Sun, 2024. "Crisis bargaining, domestic politics and Russia's invasion of Ukraine," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(5), pages 534-555, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Scott Wolford, 2024. "The bargaining framework and Russia's invasion of Ukraine," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(5), pages 485-493, September.
    2. Sasha de Vogel & Jessica S Sun, 2024. "Crisis bargaining, domestic politics and Russia's invasion of Ukraine," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(5), pages 534-555, September.

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