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Alliances as Contiguity in Spatial Models of Military Expenditures

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  • Alejandro Quiroz Flores

Abstract

What determines the level of a country’s military expenditures? Both history and theory indicate that military expenditures are strategic in nature—a country’s military expenditures depend on the military allocations of other countries. This article examines two potential sources of interdependence: geographic proximity and alliance membership. Estimation results from spatial autoregressive models show that a country’s military expenditures are positively correlated with those of its geographic neighbors. Since countries may respond positively to their neighbors’ military spending due to conflict or cooperation, the article uses alliance membership as an alternative measure of contiguity to discover potential cooperative relationships among geographic neighbors. Results indicate that a country’s military expenditures are positively correlated with the military spending of its alliance partners. This correlation is stronger between members of the same defensive alliance.

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  • Alejandro Quiroz Flores, 2011. "Alliances as Contiguity in Spatial Models of Military Expenditures," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(4), pages 402-418, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:28:y:2011:i:4:p:402-418
    DOI: 10.1177/0738894211413064
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    Cited by:

    1. Arvanitidis Paschalis & Kollias Christos & Anastasopoulos Konstantinos, 2014. "Is There an International Convergence in Defence Burdens? Some Initial Findings," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(4), pages 611-620, December.
    2. Oliver Pamp & Florian Dendorfer & Paul W. Thurner, 2018. "Arm your friends and save on defense? The impact of arms exports on military expenditures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(1), pages 165-187, October.
    3. George, Justin & Sandler, Todd, 2018. "Demand for military spending in NATO, 1968–2015: A spatial panel approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 222-236.
    4. Neumayer, Eric & Plümper, Thomas, 2016. "W," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 175-193, January.

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