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Commitment problems and Russia's invasion of Ukraine

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  • Bradley C. Smith

Abstract

This paper applies the logic of commitment problems to deliver insights about the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. In the canonical crisis bargaining framework, an anticipated power shift can cause bargaining failure. Bargaining breaks down in this context because a declining state reasons that fighting in the present from a strong position is preferable to negotiating in the future from a weaker position. I argue that this logic is relevant for understanding both Ukrainian and Russian decisionmaking in the lead-up to the invasion. The commitment problem logic also provides insight into the role of NATO in the conflict, highlighting flaws in existing arguments that the Russian invasion was “provoked†by NATO.

Suggested Citation

  • Bradley C. Smith, 2024. "Commitment problems and Russia's invasion of Ukraine," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(5), pages 494-513, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:41:y:2024:i:5:p:494-513
    DOI: 10.1177/07388942241248027
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Scott Wolford, 2024. "The bargaining framework and Russia's invasion of Ukraine," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(5), pages 485-493, September.
    2. Sasha de Vogel & Jessica S Sun, 2024. "Crisis bargaining, domestic politics and Russia's invasion of Ukraine," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(5), pages 534-555, September.

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