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Seeking No War, Achieving No Peace: The Conflict over the Siachen Glacier

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  • Tommy Andersson
  • Conan Mukherjee

Abstract

This paper models ‘no war, no peace’ situations in a game theoretical framework where two countries are engaged in a standoff over a military sector. The first main objective is to identify rational grounds for such situations and, more precisely, for the explicit equilibria that lead to such situations. It is demonstrated that both countries gain the same payoff from being in this continuous state of perpetual hostility and, moreover, that ‘no war, no peace’ situations can be explained only if the countries perceive an equal measure of military advantage from controlling the area. Given this insight, the second objective of the paper is to provide insights about how ‘no war, no peace’ situations can be resolved. Two different pathways are suggested. The first is idealistic and based on mutual trust, whereas the second is based on deterrence, involving both countries imposing a threat of using armed force against the other country in their respective military doctrines.

Suggested Citation

  • Tommy Andersson & Conan Mukherjee, 2021. "Seeking No War, Achieving No Peace: The Conflict over the Siachen Glacier," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(3), pages 253-270, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:32:y:2021:i:3:p:253-270
    DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2019.1660839
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Salah Salimian & Azadeh Ashrafi, 2024. "Resolving Conflicts and Strengthening International Relations with Investment: Game Theory Approach," Journal of Applied Economic Research, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Ural Federal University, vol. 23(1), pages 59-81.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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