IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/apsrev/v97y2003i04p633-641_00.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Information, Power, and War

Author

Listed:
  • REED, WILLIAM

Abstract

Ultimatum bargaining models of international interactions suggest that when conflict is costly and the actors are fully informed, the probability of conflict goes to zero. However, conflict occurs with some positive probability when the challenger is uncertain about the defender's reservation value. I employ a simple ultimatum game of bargaining to evaluate two traditional power-centric theories of world politics, balance of power, and power transition theory. The formal and empirical analyses demonstrate that as states approach power parity, information asymmetries are greatest, thus enhancing the probability of militarized conflict. Uncertainty is a central cause of conflict emergence and is correlated with the distribution of observable capabilities. Recognizing the relationship between the distribution of power and the uncertainty offers a more sophisticated interpretation of power-centric explanations of world politics.

Suggested Citation

  • Reed, William, 2003. "Information, Power, and War," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(4), pages 633-641, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:97:y:2003:i:04:p:633-641_00
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0003055403000923/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yuleng Zeng, 2020. "Bluff to peace: How economic dependence promotes peace despite increasing deception and uncertainty," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(6), pages 633-654, November.
    2. Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Steve Pickering, 2014. "Wars are becoming less frequent: a response to Harrison and Wolf," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 67(1), pages 214-230, February.
    3. William Spaniel, 2020. "Power transfers, military uncertainty, and war," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(4), pages 538-556, October.
    4. Alejandro Quiroz Flores, 2011. "Alliances as Contiguity in Spatial Models of Military Expenditures," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(4), pages 402-418, September.
    5. Kemal Kivanç Aköz & Pablo Hernández‐Lagos, 2019. "Rents from power for a dissident elite and mass mobilization," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 66(4), pages 584-604, September.
    6. Erik Gartzke & Dominic Rohner, 2010. "To conquer or compel: war, peace, and economic development," IEW - Working Papers 511, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    7. Işıl İdrisoğlu & William Spaniel, 2024. "Information problems and Russia's invasion of Ukraine," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(5), pages 514-533, September.
    8. Herbst, Luisa & Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2017. "Balance of power and the propensity of conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 168-184.
    9. Amy Yuen, 2009. "Target Concessions in the Shadow of Intervention," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(5), pages 745-773, October.
    10. Robert Schub, 2017. "Unfair fights: Power asymmetry, nascent nuclear capability, and preventive conflict," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(4), pages 431-455, July.
    11. Peter Bils & William Spaniel, 2017. "Policy bargaining and militarized conflict," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(4), pages 647-678, October.
    12. Benjamin E. Bagozzi, 2016. "The baseline-inflated multinomial logit model for international relations research," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 33(2), pages 174-197, April.
    13. HÃ¥vard Hegre, 2008. "Gravitating toward War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 52(4), pages 566-589, August.
    14. Casper Sakstrup, 2021. "What’s going on next door? Irregular leader change in neighboring countries, uncertainty, and civil war," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(3), pages 539-553, May.
    15. Fadiga, Mohamadou L. & Fadiga-Stewart, Leslie A., 2005. "The Political and Economic Determinants of Trade Disputes under the WTO," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19483, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    16. Toshiji Miyakawa, 2017. "The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(1), pages 205-229, June.
    17. William Spaniel, 2022. "Scientific intelligence, nuclear assistance, and bargaining," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(4), pages 447-469, July.
    18. Margit Bussmann & John R. Oneal, 2007. "Do Hegemons Distribute Private Goods?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(1), pages 88-111, February.
    19. Christopher K. Butler & Scott Gates, 2010. "The Technology of Terror: Accounting for the Strategic Use of Terrorism," Economics of Security Working Paper Series 30, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    20. Andrew Lugg, 2024. "Re-contracting intergovernmental organizations: Membership change and the creation of linked intergovernmental organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 545-577, September.
    21. Sam R. Bell, 2013. "What you don’t know can hurt you: Information, external transparency, and interstate conflict, 1982–1999," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 30(5), pages 452-468, November.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:97:y:2003:i:04:p:633-641_00. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/psr .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.