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La cible d’inflation de la Fed : continuité ou rupture ?

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  • Carré, Emmanuel

Abstract

Le 25 janvier 2012 la Réserve fédérale des États-Unis présidée par Ben Bernanke a annoncé une cible d’inflation de 2 % pourtant écartée sous la présidence précédente d’Alan Greenspan. Comment et pourquoi la Fed a-t-elle changé ses préférences ? Comment la Fed justifie-t-elle sa décision ? Pour répondre à ces questions, l’approche de la littérature sur la communication des banques centrales est utilisée. À la façon de Meade (2010), Meade et Thornton (2012), les transcriptions des réunions du Federal Open Market Committee sont étudiées, ainsi que ses discours et minutes. L’article inspecte ainsi les origines de la cible d’inflation en faisant l’historique des débats qu’elle suscite à la Fed depuis 1995. Il examine ensuite le design et les fondements théoriques de la cible d’inflation avancés par la Fed, particulièrement dans la perspective de la crise financière actuelle. Enfin, l’article analyse les limites tant théoriques qu’empiriques de ces fondations de la cible d’inflation.

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  • Carré, Emmanuel, 2013. "La cible d’inflation de la Fed : continuité ou rupture ?," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 14.
  • Handle: RePEc:rvr:journl:2013:10401
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cible d’inflation; régime de ciblage de l’inflation; communication; inflation target; inflation targeting regime; communication; metas de inflación; régimen de metas de inflación; comunicación;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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