IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/intfin/v7y2004i1p117-127.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Why the Federal Reserve Should Adopt Inflation Targeting

Author

Listed:
  • Frederic S. Mishkin

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Frederic S. Mishkin, 2004. "Why the Federal Reserve Should Adopt Inflation Targeting," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 117-127, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:intfin:v:7:y:2004:i:1:p:117-127
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1367-0271.2004.00132.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1367-0271.2004.00132.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1367-0271.2004.00132.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    2. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2002. "The Role of Output Stabilization in the Conduct of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 9291, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2002. "The Role of Output Stabilization in the Conduct of Monetary Policy," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(2), pages 213-227.
    4. Ben S. Bernanke & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1997. "Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 97-116, Spring.
    5. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
    6. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000. "What should central banks do?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 82(Nov), pages 1-14.
    7. Benjamin M. Friedman & Kenneth N. Kuttner, 1996. "A Price Target for U.S. Monetary Policy? Lessons from the Experience with Money Growth Targets," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 27(1), pages 77-146.
    8. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    9. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1978. "On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1411-1428, November.
    10. Adam S. Posen, 1995. "Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 253-274, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Athanasios Orphanides, 2002. "Monetary-Policy Rules and the Great Inflation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 115-120, May.
    12. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE: Compte Rendu par Dominique Cariofillo," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 581-590, December.
    13. Hunt, Benjamin & Rose, David & Scott, Alasdair, 2000. "The core model of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand's Forecasting and Policy System," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 247-274, April.
    14. Frederic S. Mishkin & Adam S. Posen, 1997. "Inflation targeting: lessons from four countries," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 3(Aug), pages 9-110.
    15. John B. Taylor, 1999. "Monetary Policy Rules," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number tayl99-1, February.
    16. Mr. Gauti B. Eggertsson, 2003. "How to Fight Deflation in a Liquidity Trap: Committing to Being Irresponsible," IMF Working Papers 2003/064, International Monetary Fund.
    17. Murray Sherwin, 1999. "Inflation targeting: 10 years on," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 62, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mishkin, F.S., 1998. "International Experiences with Different Monetary Policy Regimes," Papers 648, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    2. Singleton,John, 2010. "Central Banking in the Twentieth Century," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521899093, January.
    3. Akhand Akhtar Hossain, 2009. "Central Banking and Monetary Policy in the Asia-Pacific," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12777, March.
    4. Frederic S Mishkin, 1997. "Strategies for Controlling Inflation," RBA Annual Conference Volume (Discontinued), in: Philip Lowe (ed.),Monetary Policy and Inflation Targeting, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    5. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482, Elsevier.
    6. Frederic S. Mishkin, 1998. "The Dangers of Exchange‐Rate Pegging in Emerging‐Market Countries," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 81-101, October.
    7. Frederic S. Mishkin & Adam S. Posen, 1997. "Inflation targeting: lessons from four countries," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 3(Aug), pages 9-110.
    8. Anton Muscatelli & Carmine Trecroci, 2000. "Monetary Policy Rules, Policy Preferences, and Uncertainty: Recent Empirical Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 597-627, December.
    9. Joon-Ho Hahm & Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000. "Causes of the Korean Financial Crisis: Lessons for Policy," NBER Working Papers 7483, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Orphanides, Athanasios, 2003. "Historical monetary policy analysis and the Taylor rule," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(5), pages 983-1022, July.
    11. Frederic S. Mishkin & Niklas J. Westelius, 2008. "Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contracts," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(4), pages 557-582, June.
    12. P Arestis & A Mihailov, 2009. "Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion: A New Consensus in Monetary Policy," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 14(2), pages 27-54, September.
    13. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2005. "The Fed after Greenspan," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 317-332, Summer.
    14. Miniaoui, Héla & Smida, Mounir, 2008. "Crédibilité des autorités monétaires et transparence – Quelle complémentarité dans le cas de la Tunisie? Une contribution au débat," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 84(2), pages 205-234, juin.
    15. Otmar Issing, 2012. "Central Banks - Paradise Lost," IMES Discussion Paper Series 12-E-10, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
    16. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2007. "Will Monetary Policy Become More of a Science?," NBER Working Papers 13566, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. repec:rdg:wpaper:em-dp2007-53 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Qureshi, Irfan, 2015. "Monetary Policy Shifts and Central Bank Independence," MPRA Paper 81646, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2017.
    19. Berlemann, Michael & Hielscher, Kai, 2009. "Measuring Effective Monetary Policy Conservatism," Working Paper 89/2009, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
    20. Linda S. Goldberg & Michael W. Klein, 2005. "Establishing Credibility: Evolving Perceptions of the European Central Bank," NBER Working Papers 11792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Alexander Mihailov, 2007. "Does Instrument Independence Matter under the Constrained Discretionof an Inflation Targeting Goal? Lessons from UK Taylor Rule Empirics," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2006 95, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:intfin:v:7:y:2004:i:1:p:117-127. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1367-0271 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.