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The Informational Effect of Monetary Policy and the Case for Policy Commitment

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  • Chengcheng Jia

Abstract

I study how the informational effect of monetary policy changes the optimal conduct of monetary policy. In my model, the private sector extracts information about unobserved shocks from the central bank's interest rate decisions. The central bank optimally changes the informational effect of the interest rate by committing to a state-contingent policy rule, in which case the Phillips curve becomes endogenous to the central bank's optimization problem. In a dynamic model, the optimal policy rule overshoots the natural-rate shock and gradually responds to the cost-push shock, which makes the interest rate change expected output growth but not expected inflation.

Suggested Citation

  • Chengcheng Jia, 2019. "The Informational Effect of Monetary Policy and the Case for Policy Commitment," Working Papers 19-07R, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, revised 09 May 2022.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwq:190700
    DOI: 10.26509/frbc-wp-201907r
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Faust Jon & Swanson Eric T & Wright Jonathan H, 2004. "Do Federal Reserve Policy Surprises Reveal Superior Information about the Economy?," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-31, October.
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    6. Adam, Klaus, 2007. "Optimal monetary policy with imperfect common knowledge," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 267-301, March.
    7. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Efficient Use of Information and Social Value of Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1103-1142, July.
    8. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
    9. repec:pri:cepsud:161blinder is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Jenny Tang, 2013. "Uncertainty and the signaling channel of monetary policy," Working Papers 15-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    11. Swanson, Eric T., 2006. "Have Increases in Federal Reserve Transparency Improved Private Sector Interest Rate Forecasts?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(3), pages 791-819, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kurt Graden Lunsford, 2018. "Understanding the Aspects of Federal Reserve Forward Guidance," Working Papers (Old Series) 1815, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    2. Enders, Zeno & Hünnekes, Franziska & Müller, Gernot J., 2019. "Monetary policy announcements and expectations: Evidence from german firms," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 45-63.
    3. Ehrmann, Michael & Gaballo, Gaetano & Hoffmann, Peter & Strasser, Georg, 2019. "Can more public information raise uncertainty? The international evidence on forward guidance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 93-112.
    4. Chengcheng Jia, 2019. "Forward Guidance under Imperfect Information: Instrument Based or State Contingent?," Working Papers 19-22, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    5. Wesley Janson & Chengcheng Jia, 2020. "The Information Effect of Monetary Policy: Self-Defeating or Optimal?," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, vol. 2020(15), pages 1-5, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary Policy; information frictions; policy commitment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation

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