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L'Union monétaire européenne : une revue de la littérature théorique

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  • Andrew Brociner

Abstract

[eng] European Monetary Union: A Survey . This survey considers the broad themes of European Monetary Union: optimal currency areas; a European Central Bank (ECB); and European fiscal policy. Each of these themes is the subject of controversy in the political arena as well as in the theoretical literature. The paper considers different criteria and empirical evidence which compare Europe to existing optimal currency areas. Europe qualifies on some but not all criteria. Another issue is the creation of the ECB. The gain in terms of credibility is not as transparent as for the EMS, because of the proposed structure of the ECB and of the relationship between the monetary and fiscal authorities. Finally, the issue of fiscal policy in Europe is examined. Different arguments both for and againstthe coordination of fiscal policy in Europe are presented, and the subject of fiscal federalism is discussed. Given the issues of national sovereignty and the size of the Community budget, it would be better to operate a reduced federal fiscal system, which would permit individual countries greater autonomy to offset asymmetric shocks. [fre] Cet article traite les grands thèmes de l'Union monétaire européenne : les zones monétaires optimales, la Banque centrale et la politique budgétaire européenne. Chacun de ces thèmes est sujet à controverse dans la littérature théorique. Peut-on, par exemple, caractériser l'Europe comme une zone monétaire optimale ? De plus, si les pays membres du Système monétaire européen ont pu bénéficier de gains de crédibilité, cela ne se reproduira pas nécessairement dans l'Union monétaire. Enfin, il y a de nombreux arguments à la fois pour et contre la coordination des politiques budgétaires en Europe.

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  • Andrew Brociner, 1993. "L'Union monétaire européenne : une revue de la littérature théorique," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 43(1), pages 349-363.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:rvofce:ofce_0751-6614_1993_num_43_1_1307
    DOI: 10.3406/ofce.1993.1307
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ofce.1993.1307
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