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The Welfare Economics of Cooperative and Uncooperative Fiscal Policy

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  • Buiter, Willem H.
  • Kletzer, Kenneth

Abstract

In a competitive two-country overlapping generations model with perfect capital mobility, a plan that is individually Pareto optimal (that is Pareto optimal with respect to individual preferences) can be sustained without coordination of national fiscal policies where the fiscal arsenal is restricted to lump-sum taxes and government borrowing. Cooperation is required to achieve a Pareto optimum with respect to the two utilitarian national social welfare functions. Cooperation and international side payments are required to achieve an optimum with respect to a utilitarian global social welfare functi.

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  • Buiter, Willem H. & Kletzer, Kenneth, 1990. "The Welfare Economics of Cooperative and Uncooperative Fiscal Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 420, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:420
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    1. Buiter, Willem H. & Kletzer, Kenneth, 1990. "Fiscal Policy Interdependence and Efficiency," CEPR Discussion Papers 419, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Hillier, Brian & Malcomson, James M, 1984. "Dynamic Inconsistency, Rational Expectations, and Optimal Government Policy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1437-1451, November.
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    5. Calvo, Guillermo A & Obstfeld, Maurice, 1988. "Optimal Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy with Finite Lifetimes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 411-432, March.
    6. O'Connell, Stephen A & Zeldes, Stephen P, 1988. "Rational Ponzi Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(3), pages 431-450, August.
    7. Kydland, Finn E. & Prescott, Edward C., 1980. "Dynamic optimal taxation, rational expectations and optimal control," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 79-91, May.
    8. Turnovsky, Stephen J. & Brock, William A., 1980. "Time consistency and optimal government policies in perfect foresight equilibrium," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 183-212, April.
    9. Fischer, Stanley, 1980. "Dynamic inconsistency, cooperation and the benevolent dissembling government," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 93-107, May.
    10. Chamley, Christophe, 1985. "Efficient Taxation in a Stylized Model of Intertemporal General Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(2), pages 451-468, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Krichel & Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman, 1996. "Fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union: Credible inflation targets or monetized debt?," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 132(1), pages 28-54, March.
    2. Erling Steigum Jr., "undated". "Fiscal Deficits, Asset Prices and Intergenerational Distribution in an Open Unionized Economy," EPRU Working Paper Series 97-19, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    3. Willem H. Buiter & Anne Sibert & Anne C. Sibert, 2011. "Government Budget Deficits in Large Open Economies," CESifo Working Paper Series 3476, CESifo.
    4. Østrup, Finn, 2005. "Fiscal Policy and Welfare under Different Exchange Rate Regimes," Working Papers 2005-1, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance.
    5. Andrew Brociner, 1993. "L'Union monétaire européenne : une revue de la littérature théorique," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 43(1), pages 349-363.
    6. Arjan Lejour & Harrie Verbon, 1996. "Capital mobility, wage bargaining, and social insurance policies in an economic union," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(4), pages 495-513, October.
    7. Kollintzas, Tryphon & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Vassilatos, Vanghelis, 1999. "Normative Aspects of Fiscal Policy in an Economic Union: a Review," CEPR Discussion Papers 2212, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Kollintzas, T. Philippopoulos, A. & Vasillatos, V., 1999. "Normative Aspects of Fiscal Policy in an Economic Union: a Theoretical Review," Athens University of Economics and Business 109, Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of International and European Economic Studies.
    9. Jiming Ha & Anne Sibert, 1997. "Strategic Capital Taxation in Large Open Economies with Mobile Capital," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 4(3), pages 243-262, July.
    10. Willem H. Buiter & Anne C. Sibert, 2003. "Cross-Border Tax Externalities: Are Budget Deficits too Small?," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000430, UCLA Department of Economics.
    11. Buiter, Willem H. & Sibert, Anne C., 2016. "Government deficits in large open economies: The problem of too little public debt," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 10, pages 1-39.
    12. Jiming Ha & Anne Sibert, 1997. "Strategic Capital Taxation in Large Open Economies with Mobile Capital," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 4(3), pages 243-262, July.
    13. Erling Steigum, 2001. "Trade Unions and the Burden of the Public Debt," CESifo Working Paper Series 587, CESifo.
    14. Kletzer, Kenneth M., 1997. "Macroeconomic stabilization with a common currency: Does European Monetary Unification create a need for fiscal insurance of federalism?," ZEI Working Papers B 04-1997, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
    15. Yasushi Iwamoto & Akihisa Shibata, 1999. "Foreign Tax Credit and the Current Account," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 6(2), pages 131-148, May.
    16. Verbic, Miroslav & Majcen, Boris & Cok, Mitja, 2009. "Education and Economic Growth in Slovenia: A Dynamic General Equilibrium Approach with Endogenous Growth," MPRA Paper 17817, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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