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L'analyse économique de la résolution des conflits juridiques

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  • Bruno Deffains

Abstract

[eng] The major part of legal conflicts is not solved by trials but by settlements between parties. The purpose is to identify factors which can influence the probability of a settlement and the amount of the transaction. Immediately after a claim has been made by the victim of a damage against the author, parties can negociate and surrender the trial. The main problem arises because this kind of situation is caracterised by asymetrie informations which influence the parties'decisions or their lawyers'ones. This problem was neglected for a long while by the economic analysis of courts which explains the conflict's resolution from the parties'optimism. Now, the study of legal conflicts focuses on the asymetrie informations and how they change the rules of bargaining in screening and signaling models. The paper synthesizes different strategic behaviors and their outcomes in terms of economic efficiency when parties have to take their decisions to negotiate or to wait for the judgement. Under some hypothesis on the nature of bargaining, it is possible to endogeneize the probability, the amount and, in a dynamic context, the time of settlement. [fre] Une partie importante des conflits juridiques n'est pas résolue par les tribunaux, mais par des accords directs entre les parties. La question se pose alors de savoir quels sont les facteurs susceptibles d'influencer la probabilité de parvenir à un accord et le montant de la transaction. Dès lors qu'une plainte a été déposée par la victime d'un dommage à l'encontre du (ou des) présumé(s) responsable(s), les parties peuvent à tout moment décider de demander la radiation de l'affaire des rôles du tribunal. Le problème principal réside dans le fait que les situations de ce type sont caractérisées par de fortes asymétries d'information qui vont influencer les décisions des parties ou de leurs représentants (avocats). Longtemps ce problème a été négligé par l'analyse économique du fonctionnement de la justice qui expliquait la résolution des conflits par voie judiciaire en se fondant sur « l'optimisme » des justiciables. Désormais, l'étude des conflits juridiques se focalise sur les problèmes d'information et la façon dont ils affectent les règles gouvernant les négociations dans le cadre de jeux de filtrage ou de signal. Il ressort notamment que les individus ayant le moins de chances d'être jugés responsables sont paradoxalement ceux qui subissent les coûts les plus élevés afin de pouvoir être distingués des autres. L'article étudie les différents comportements stratégiques pouvant être adoptés et les conséquences de ces comportements en termes d'efficacité économique lorsque les justiciables doivent déterminer leurs décisions pour trouver un accord ou attendre le jugement. En introduisant certaines hypothèses sur le déroulement de la négociation entre deux parties adverses, il est possible d'endogénéiser la probabilité et le montant de l'accord voire, dans un cadre dynamique, le moment où il intervient.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Deffains, 1997. "L'analyse économique de la résolution des conflits juridiques," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 12(3), pages 57-99.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1997_num_12_3_1027
    DOI: 10.3406/rfeco.1997.1027
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.1997.1027
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chung, Tai-Yeong, 1996. "Settlement of Litigation under Rule 68: An Economic Analysis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 261-286, January.
    2. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    3. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-661, May.
    4. Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-149, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Barrère, 1999. "Economic Approaches of the Judicial System [Les approches économiques du système judiciaire]," Post-Print hal-02615930, HAL.
    2. Frédéric Marty & Arnaud Voisin, 2007. "Les difficultés d’exécution des Partenariats Public-Privé: le retour d’expérience des contrats de Private Finance Initiative britanniques," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2007-26, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    3. Veronique Thireau, 2011. "Economie du nucléaire et contentieux," Post-Print hal-01221360, HAL.

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