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Un modèle de comportement bureaucratique de la Banque centrale. Le cas de la BCEAO

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  • Tchétché N'Guessan

Abstract

[eng] A bureautic model of central bank behavior : the case of BCEAO . . Traditional monetary theories consider that central banks set their monetary policy with the sole objective of achievement public interest.. By relying upon the theory of the bureaucracy, this article sustains that the authorities of central banks but more specifically those of BCEAO are also searching for their personal interest. It is thus shown that the search for personal interest by it's authorities has an influence on the monetary policy of BCEAO. [fre] Un modèle de comportement bureaucratique de la Banque centrale. Le cas de la BCEAO. . Les théories monétaires traditionnelles considèrent que les banques centrales conduisent leurs politiques monétaires en vue uniquement de réaliser l'intérêt général.. Cet article soutient, à partir de la théorie de la bureaucratie, que, tout en ayant pour objectif de réaliser l'intérêt général, les dirigeants des banques centrales et particulièrement ceux de la BCEAO recherchent aussi leurs intérêts personnels. On montre ainsi que les objectifs personnels des dirigeants de la BCEAO influencent aussi la politique monétaire de cette banque.

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  • Tchétché N'Guessan, 1991. "Un modèle de comportement bureaucratique de la Banque centrale. Le cas de la BCEAO," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(5), pages 901-916.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1991_num_42_5_409315
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1991.409315
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1991.409315
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Toma, Mark, 1982. "Inflationary bias of the Federal Reserve System : A bureaucratic perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 163-190.
    2. Froyen, Richard T., 1974. "A test of the endogeneity of monetary policy," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 175-188, July.
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