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Distributive Conflict And Monetary Policy

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  • THOMAS HAVRILESKY

Abstract

This paper develops a public choice theory of monetary policy and compares it with political‐macroeconomic outcomes theory. The paper develops support for the public choice theory from recent historical evidence. It then employs this theory to explain the difficulty of effecting monetary reform and, in the absence of reform, the difficulty of implementing sustained periods of monetary restraint.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Havrilesky, 1990. "Distributive Conflict And Monetary Policy," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 8(2), pages 50-61, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:8:y:1990:i:2:p:50-61
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1990.tb00590.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dawes, Robyn M & Thaler, Richard H, 1988. "Anomalies: Cooperation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 187-197, Summer.
    2. Toma, Mark, 1982. "Inflationary bias of the Federal Reserve System : A bureaucratic perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 163-190.
    3. Bernheim, B Douglas & Stark, Oded, 1988. "Altruism within the Family Reconsidered: Do Nice Guys Finish Last?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1034-1045, December.
    4. Alex Cukierman, 1986. "Central bank behavior and credibility: some recent theoretical developments," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 5-17.
    5. Sargent, Thomas J & Wallace, Neil, 1973. "Rational Expectations and the Dynamics of Hyperinflation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 14(2), pages 328-350, June.
    6. Havrilesky, Thomas M, 1987. "A Partisanship Theory of Fiscal and Monetary Regimes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(3), pages 308-325, August.
    7. Richard E. Wagner, 1986. "Central Banking and the Fed: A Public Choice Perspective," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 6(2), pages 519-543, Fall.
    8. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
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    Cited by:

    1. Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1126-1139.
    2. repec:zbw:rwirep:0094 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Robert D. Auerbach, 1991. "Institutional Preservation At The Federal Reserve," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 9(3), pages 46-58, July.
    4. Jeffrey A. Frankel, 1990. "The Making of Exchange Rate Policy in the 1980s," NBER Working Papers 3539, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Ansgar Belke & Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Ruhr Economic Papers 0094, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.

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