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L'analyse économique des conventions du travail

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  • Robert Salais

Abstract

[eng] The economic analysis of labour conventions. . Even by taking the concepts of authority, contract or incitation, the theories of market encounter many unsolved difficultes when they try to extent the market patterns to the labour relation. The article emphasizes that the labour relation is built on a compromise between two principles of equivalence, the first one trading wage against future work time, the second one putting as equivalent work time and labour product. The author attempts to reinterpret the labour relation in terms of labour conventions ; two conventions are introduced : the convention of productivity and the convention of unemployment. Economie features and rules of these conventions are analysed and illustrated by some examples. Finally one considers to what extent the Keynes' General Theory offers a suitable theoretical framework to the labour conventions. [fre] L'analyse économique des conventions du travail. . La relation de travail est exemplaire des difficultés que rencontre l'extension des théories du marché, que ce soit par le biais de l'autorité, du contrat ou de l'incitation. L'article souligne que la relation de travail repose sur un compromis entre deux principes d'équivalence, l'un marchand salaire-temps de travail futur, l'autre non marchand temps-produit du travail. Il propose de la réinterpréter en termes de conventions du travail. Deux conventions sont introduites : la convention de productivité et la convention de chômage. Leurs caractéristiques économiques sont analysées, ainsi que les règles les instrumentant, et illustrées d'exemples. On examine enfin en quoi la Théorie générale de Keynes offre un cadre théorique susceptible d'intégrer les conventions du travail.

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  • Robert Salais, 1989. "L'analyse économique des conventions du travail," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(2), pages 199-240.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1989_num_40_2_409139
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    3. Emmanuelle Cheyns & Ponte Stefano, 2016. "Convention Theory In The Anglophone Litterature Of Agri Food Studies [L'Economie Des Conventions Dans La Litterature Anglophone Des Etudes Agro Alimentaires]," Working Papers hal-01393304, HAL.
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    5. Guillemette de Larquier, 2013. "Recrutement et détermination du salaire : l'importance des règles et des conventions," Post-Print hal-01720885, HAL.
    6. Franck Bailly & François-Xavier Devetter & François Horn, 2012. "Est-il possible d'améliorer les conditions de travail et d'emploi dans le secteur des services à la personne ? Une analyse en termes de mondes de production," Post-Print halshs-00805678, HAL.
    7. Liêm Hoang-Ngoc, 1998. "Une critique de l'économie politique néo-institutionnaliste du contrat de travail," Cahiers d'Économie Politique, Programme National Persée, vol. 33(1), pages 81-106.
    8. Modenesi, Rui Lyrio & Modenesi, André de Melo & Martins, Norberto Montani & Fontaine, Patrick, 2015. "Restructuring the Economic Policy Framework in Brazil: Genuine or Gattopardo change?," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 17.
    9. Clarisse Cazals & Marie Lemariè, 2011. "Land-use conflicts and quality on the coastal area "Bassin d'Arcachon": a regional newspapers analysis," ERSA conference papers ersa10p1331, European Regional Science Association.
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    11. David Marsden, 2004. "The ‘Network Economy’ and Models of the Employment Contract," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 42(4), pages 659-684, December.
    12. Marsden, David, 2004. "The 'network economy' and models of the employment contract: psychological, economic and legal," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4676, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    13. Jean-Pierre Bréchet & Nathalie Schieb-Bienfait, 2011. "Logique d'action et projet dans l'action collective : Réflexions théoriques comparées," Post-Print hal-01417047, HAL.
    14. Gabriel Colletis & Etienne Fieux & Anne Isla & Adrien Peneranda, 2020. "De la donnée à l’information : de l’importance des conventions dans les organisations," Post-Print hal-02547352, HAL.
    15. Joan Le Goff, 2014. "Normes juridiques et règles du jeu stratégique," Post-Print hal-02936763, HAL.
    16. Didry, Claude & Diaz-Bone, Rainer, 2013. "Contributing to a pragmatic institutionalism of economic law: Claude Didry interviewed by Rainer Diaz-Bone," economic sociology. perspectives and conversations, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, vol. 14(2), pages 61-68.
    17. Herve Charmettant & Michel Rocca, 2010. "20 ans après, que reste-t-il de l'économie des conventions ? Points de départ pour une contribution à un institutionnalisme unifié," Post-Print halshs-00723399, HAL.

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