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Protection sociale et politiques redistributives dans le contexte de l'UEM

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  • Jean Bensaid
  • Stéphane Jacobzone
  • Gérard Lattes

Abstract

[spa] Proteccion social y politicas redistributivas en el contexto de la UEM . La puesta en prâctica de la Union econômica y monetaria (UEM) tendra repercusiones sobre los sistemas de proteccion social de los paîses de la Comunidad Europea. Mâs desarrollados en los paîses donde el nivel de vida es mâs elevado, tienden a converger parcialmente, pero dicha convergencia afecta mâs a sus misiones redistributivas que a sus modalidades de financiaciôn. La toma en cuenta de los objetivos redistributes a un nivel comunitario incide sobre todo en el marco regional. La UEM corre el riesgo de poner en competencia las polîticas redistributivas de los Estados miembros. En un contexto de movilidad mâs fuerte de los factores de producciôn, las . divergencias nacionales en cuanto a redistribuciôn pueden revelarse mâs costosas. Parecen sin embargo descartados los riesgos de movilidad excesiva del trabajo. La autonomîa de estas polîticas, prenda de eficacia y de adecuaciôn a las preferencias locales, podrîa quedar preservada. Entonces la UEM plantearâ dos cuestiones centrales para Francia : por una parte la de las modalidades de financiaciôn de la proteccion social y el grado de progresividad de la contribuciôn; por otra la de las posibilidades de regular los gastos mientras vaya aumentando su eficacia. [eng] Social Security and Redistributive Policies in the EMU Context . The introduction of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) will affect the social security systems in the European Community countries. These systems are more developed where income is higher. They tend to be similar in some areas, but this convergence concerns more their redistributive missions than their financing methods. The consideration of redistributive goals at Community level comes into play mainly at a regional level. Moreover, EMU may well force the redistributive policies of the Member States to compete with one another. Against a backdrop of greater production factor mobility, national redistribution disparities may well end up being more costly. However, the risks of excessive labour mobility would appear to be remote. The independence of these policies, which are a gauge of efficiency and suitability as regards local priorities, could be preserved. EMU will consequently raise two central questions for France: the ways of financing social security and the extent of the progressive increase in these contributions; and the possibilities of controlling spending whilst increasing its efficiency. [ger] Soziale Sicherheit und Umverteilungspolitik vor dem Hintergrund der WWU . Die Errichtung der Wirtschafts- und Wàhrungsunion (WWU) wird Auswirkungen auf die Système der sozialen Sicherheit in den EG-Mitgliedstaaten haben. Die Sozialsysteme, die in den Làndem mit dem hôchsten Pro-Kopf-Einkommen am weitesten entwickelt sind, gleichen sich zwar teilweise einander an; diese Konvergenz betrifft jedoch eher ihre Umverteilungs- aufgaben als ihre Finanzierungsarten. Die Verwirklichung der Umverteilungsziele erfolgt im Rahmen der Europàischen Gemeinschaft vor allem auf regionaler Ebene. Die Schaffung der WWU kônnte im ùbrigen dazu fuhren, daB sich die Umverteilungspolitiken der einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten einander Konkurrenz machen. Vor dem Hintergrund der zunehmenden Mobilitàt der Produktionsfaktoren kônnten die nationalen Unterschiede bei der Umverteilung betràchtliche Kosten verursachen. Die Gefahren einer ùbermâBigen Arbeitsmobilitàt scheinen allerdings gebannt zu sein. Die Unabhângigkeit dieser Politiken, eine der Voraussetzungen fur ihre Leistungsfàhigkeit und ihre Anpassung an die lokalen Gegebenheiten, wird nicht aufgegeben. Im Zusammenhang mit der Verwirklichung der WWU stellen sich fur Frankreich somit zwei zentrale Fragen: und zwar einerseits die Frage nach der Art der Finanzierung des sozialen Schutzes und dem Grad der Progression der Sozialabgaben sowie andererseits das Problem, wie man die Ausgaben bei Steigerung der Leistungsfàhigkeit in den Griff bekommen kann. [fre] Protection sociale et politiques redistributives dans le contexte de l'UEM . Les systèmes de protection sociale des pays de la Communauté européenne reflètent les écarts de richesse des États membres : plus le revenu est élevé, plus les systèmes sont développés. Ils tendent à se rapprocher partiellement, mais cette convergence concerne plus leurs missions redistributives que leurs modalités de financement. Au niveau communautaire, la prise en compte des objectifs redistributifs joue surtout à l'échelon régional. . Dans le contexte de l'UEM, avec une mobilité plus forte des facteurs de production, les divergences nationales en matière redistributive pourraient s'avérer plus coûteuses. Cependant, les risques de mobilité excessive du travail semblent écartés. La mise en concurrence des politiques redistributives des États membres sera sans doute très limitée, et l'autonomie de ces politiques, gage d'efficacité et d'adéquation aux préférences locales, pourra être préservée. Dès lors, l'UEM soulèvera en France deux questions centrales : d'une part, les modalités de financement de la protection sociale et le degré de progressivité de ce prélèvement ; d'autre part, la possibilité de maîtriser les dépenses tout en accroissant leur efficacité.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Bensaid & Stéphane Jacobzone & Gérard Lattes, 1993. "Protection sociale et politiques redistributives dans le contexte de l'UEM," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 262(1), pages 87-99.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_1993_num_262_1_5725
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.1993.5725
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.1993.5725
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michel Grignon & Antoine Math, 1996. "Simulation des conséquences redistributives de divers modes de renforcement de la sélectivité des allocations familiales," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 122(1), pages 13-31.
    2. Stéphane Jacobzone, 1996. "Les politiques de santé face aux propriétés incitatives et redistributives des systèmes d'assurance-maladie," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 291(1), pages 49-70.

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