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Fédéralisme budgétaire et unification économique européenne

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  • Dominique Bureau
  • Paul Champsaur

Abstract

[fre] Avec l'achèvement du marché unique et l'adoption du traité sur l'union économique et monétaire, qui se fixe l'horizon 1999 pour le passage à la monnaie unique, la nature de la Communauté européenne se transforme. Celle-ci devient progressivement une fédération. . Cependant l'évolution vers le fédéralisme peut être plus ou moins rapide selon les domaines, et il y a débat quant au rôle budgétaire et fiscal confié à la Communauté. L'actualité de ce débat est renforcé par la nécessité de tirer rapidement les conséquences budgétaires du Traité de Maastricht, l'accord interinstitutionnel entre le Conseil, le Parlement et la Commission qui encadre actuellement la procédure budgétaire communautaire arrivant à échéance. Or, ce Traité en renouvelle les données de base, compte tenu du renforcement des pouvoirs du Parlement, de l'extension du champ des politiques communautaires, de la création prochaine d'un Fonds de cohésion, enfin de la correction annoncée des éléments régressifs du système de ressources propres de la Communauté. . Ainsi il apparaît opportun de clarifier le cadre de réflexion économique adapté à l'analyse de ces questions. Dans cette perspective, nous nous proposons de discuter l'idée suivant laquelle l'imitation progressive par le budget communautaire des mécansimes budgétaires et fiscaux à l'œuvre dans les fédérations existantes est inévitable, voire souhaitable. [eng] The completion of the Single Market together with the monetary union perspective are transforming the EEC into an emerging federation. However federalism has several components and may advance in certain areas without taking off elsexhere. Therefore, whether such an evolution towards federalism will concern the EEC fiscal rotle is open to question. . This article examines the constraints imposed by the european integration on national fiscal policies and the development of redistributive actions at the EEC level. It concludes that the reference to fiscal federalism does not seem to be well adapted to the description of the present EEC fiscal role and of its predictable evolution in the near future.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Bureau & Paul Champsaur, 1992. "Fédéralisme budgétaire et unification économique européenne," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(1), pages 87-99.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:rvofce:ofce_0751-6614_1992_num_40_1_1270
    DOI: 10.3406/ofce.1992.1270
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ofce.1992.1270
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    1. Barry Eichengreen, 1992. "Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area?," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Silvio Borner & Herbert Grubel (ed.), The European Community after 1992, chapter 8, pages 138-161, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Jeffrey Sachs, 1991. "Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe From the United States," NBER Working Papers 3855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Wildasin, David E, 1990. "Budgetary Pressures in the EEC: A Fiscal Federalism Perspective," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 69-74, May.
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    3. Catherine Mathieu & Henri Sterdyniak, 2003. "Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact: Breaking the Ice," Working Papers hal-00972861, HAL.
    4. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1783 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/1783 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Catherine Mathieu & Henri Sterdyniak, 2003. "Réformer le pacte de stabilité : l'état du débat," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 84(1), pages 145-179.
    7. Jean Bensaid & Stéphane Jacobzone & Gérard Lattes, 1993. "Protection sociale et politiques redistributives dans le contexte de l'UEM," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 262(1), pages 87-99.
    8. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/766 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Frédérique Bec & Jean-Olivier Hairault, 1997. "Fédéralisme budgétaire et stabilisation macroéconomique en Europe," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(3), pages 505-517.
    10. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/1783 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Frédéric Zumer, 1998. "Stabilisation et redistribution budgétaires entre régions : État centralisé, État fédéral," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 65(1), pages 243-289.

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