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Les politiques de santé face aux propriétés incitatives et redistributives des systèmes d'assurance-maladie

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  • Stéphane Jacobzone

Abstract

[fre] Les politiques de santé face aux propriétés incitatives et redistributives des systèmes d'assurance maladie . Les systèmes de santé visent à la couverture d'un risque, le risque maladie. Ceci leur confère une indiscutable dimension assurantielle, et justifie qu'on examine leur fonctionnement d'un point de vue d'économie de l'assurance. Les apports d'un tel examen se situent à trois niveaux. . Le premier consiste en un cadre d'analyse globale permettant de comprendre les raisons et les modalités de l'intervention publique. Celle-ci est toujours présente, mais n'intègre pas toujours l'ensemble des éléments du système, qui est souvent hybride et utilise un certain nombre de mécanismes de marché. Différents arguments d'efficacité et d'équité peuvent être utilisés pour justifier l'intervention mais aussi pour comprendre son caractère partiel. . Le deuxième est relatif à l'influence de l'assurance sur les comportements et inclut une expertise empirique. Cela concerne notamment les effets de sur-consommation dus à la présence de la couverture, pour examiner dans quelle mesure il faut envisager une régulation partielle par des tickets modérateurs. Ces effets existent, mais leur gestion doit rester attentive aux inégalités de revenu et de morbidité. Le cas spécifique de la couverture complémentaire ou supplémentaire est aussi étudié, en examinant notamment les interactions avec le système de base. . Le troisième se situe à la frontière des rôles assurantiel et redistributif du système, pour tenter d'isoler le deuxième aspect et de l'évaluer séparément. Cette analyse en termes d'équité fournit alors des critères d'appréciation complémentaires permettant notamment des comparaisons internationales. [spa] Las polîticas de salud trente a las propiedades incentivas y redistributivas de los sistemas de seguro médico . Los sistemas de salud tienen como fin la cobertura de un riesgo, el riesgo enfermedad, lo cual les confiera un carâcter aseguramental innegable. Por eso estudiamos su funcionamiento desde el enfoque de la economia del seguro. Las aportaciones de dicho estudio abarcan très nivelés. . El primera consiste en un cuadro de anâlisis global que permita entender los motivos y las modalidades de la intervention pûblica. Esta es siempre présente, pero no intégra siempre todos aquellos elementos que componen el sistema, el cual a veces es hfbrido y se vale de unos cuantos mecanismos del mercado. Nos podemos valerde diferentes argumentos de eficacia y de equidad para justificar la intervention asî como para comprender su carâcter partial. . El segundo se refiere a la influencia del seguro sobre los comportamientos e incluye un examen empîrico. Se valoran ante todo los efectos de supraconsumo debidos a la presencia de la cobertura, para examinar en que medida hace falta proponerse una regulation partial mediante una participaciôn no reembolsable. Taies efectos existen, pero su gestion debe seguir atenta a las desigualdades de renta y de morbosidad. En fin el caso especifico de la cobertura complementaria o suplemen- taria es estudiado, examinândose ante todo las interacciones con el sistema bâsico. . El tercero se situa entre lasfunciones de seguro y redistributivas del sistema, para tratar de afslar el ultimo aspecto y de valorarlo de manera autônoma. Tal anâlisis en términos de equidad proporciona entonces unos criterios de juicio complementarios que permiten ante todo unas comparaciones internacionales. [ger] Die Gesundheitspolitiken angesichts der Anreiz- und Umverteilungsmerkmale der Krankenversicherungssysteme . Die Aufgabe der Gesundheitssysteme besteht in der Deckung eines Risikos, und zwar des Krankheitsrisikos. Dadurch erhalten sie zweifelsohne den Charakter einer Versicherung, was die Erôrterung ihrer Funktionsweise in einem versicherungswirtschaftlichen Kontext rechtfertigt. Eine solche Prùfung erfolgt auf drei Ebenen. Bei der ersten Ebene handelt es sich um einen globalen Analyserahmen, der die Grûnde und die Modalitâten der ôffentlichen Intervention verstehen hilft. Letztere ist stets gegenwârtig, bezieht sich jedoch nicht immer auf sâmtliche Elemente des Systems, das oftmals hybrid ist und eine Reihe von Marktmechanismen verwendet. Zur Rechtfertigung dieser Intervention, aber auch zum Verstândnis ihres partiellen Charakters kônnen verschiedene Effizienz- und Gerechtigkeitsargumente herangezogen werden. . Die zweite Ebene bezieht sich auf den EinfluB der Versicherung auf die Verhaltensweisen und umfaBt eine . empirische Begutachtung. Sie betrifft vor allem die Effekte des versicherungsbedingten Ùberkonsums, damit untersucht werden kann, inwiefern eine partielle Regulierung durch eine Selbstbeteiligung erwogen werden sollte. Solche Effekte gibt es zwar; doch muB bei ihrer Steuerung den ungleichen Einkûnften und der unterschiedlichen Morbiditât Rechnung getragen werden. SchlieBlich wird noch der spezielle Fall der Zusatz- oder Ergânzungsversicherung erôrtert, insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Wechselwirkungen mit dem Grund- system. . Die dritte Ebene befindet sich an der Trennlinie zwischen der Versicherungs- und der Umverteilungsaufgabe des Systems, damit der zweite Aspekt gesondert bewertet werden kann. Durch dièse Analyse hinsichtlich der Gerechtigkeit erhâlt man dann zusâtzliche Bewertungs- kriterien, anhand derer sich insbesondere internationale Vergleiche anstellen lassen. [eng] Health Policies Weighed Against the Incentive and Redistributive Properties of the Health Insurance Systems . The health systems are designed to cover a risk; namely the health risk. This gives them an indisputable insurance aspect and justifies a study of their management from the point of view of insurance economics. Such a study is made up of three elements. . The first results from using a global analytic framework to understand public intervention reasons and methods. Intervention is always present, but does not always embody all the elements of the system, which is often hybrid and uses a certain number of market mechanisms. Different efficiency and equity arguments can be put forward to justify intervention and understand its partial nature. . The second considers how insurance affects behaviour and includes an empirical survey. This focuses on the effects of overconsumption due to the presence of coverage. The aim is to analyze to what extent the system should be partially regulated by patients' contributions towards medical costs. These effects exist, but the way they are handled should bear in mind inequalities in income and morbidity. Lastly, the specific case of supplementary coverage is studied by examining, in particular, interaction with the basic system. . The third is on the borderline between the insurance and redistributive roles of the system. The aim is to isolate the second aspect and evaluate it separately. This analysis of equity thus provides the additional assessment criteria needed to make international comparisons.

Suggested Citation

  • Stéphane Jacobzone, 1996. "Les politiques de santé face aux propriétés incitatives et redistributives des systèmes d'assurance-maladie," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 291(1), pages 49-70.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_1996_num_291_1_6029
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.1996.6029
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.1996.6029
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stéphane Jacobzone, 1998. "Le rôle des prix dans la régulation du secteur pharmaceutique," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 312(1), pages 35-53.

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