IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/ecstat/estat_0336-1454_1992_num_258_1_6563.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Transports et environnement

Author

Listed:
  • Alain Bonnafous

Abstract

[fre] Transport et environnement : comment valoriser et maîtriser les effets externes ? . Les transports ont des impacts généralement négatifs sur l'environnement. Ils constituent, par exemple, la plus importante source de bruit. Ils contribuent à la pollution de l'air. Ces effets sont qualifiés d'externes lorsque aucune contrepartie pécuniaire n'est assurée par celui qui les provoque. La solution au problème consiste à imposer une telle contrepartie, ce qui correspond à une intemalisation. Mais, de même qu'il y a des formes très diverses d'effets externes, il y a des dispositifs très différents d'intemalisation. . Le responsable de l'effet externe ne paye une contrepartie que dans le cas d'une intemalisation qui sera dite radicale. L'internalisation pécuniaire non radicale peut aussi être observée, par exemple à travers des dépenses de protection contre le bruit. C'est la victime et non plus le coupable qui est alors le payeur. Les investissements publics de transport sont, le plus souvent, destinés à résorber des . fets externes comme ceux qui sont liés aux encombrements. Il s'agit alors d'une intemalisation budgétaire payée par le contribuable. Par extension, on peut enfin parler d'intemalisation sensible lorsqu'il y a, par exemple, prise de conscience des externalités biosphériques. . Qu'il s'agisse d'évaluer en termes monétaires les effets des transports sur l'environnement ou de définir les mesures destinées à les maîtriser, ces différentes formes d'intemalisation se trouvent successivement impliquées. Les experts et le législateur se sont livrés à un tel exercice en Suède de sorte que l'environnement soit pris en compte dans les grands arbitrages de la politique de transport. En appliquant ces résultats au cas des transports routiers de marchandises en France, on est conduit à des évaluations de coûts externes particulièrement élevés. [eng] Transport and the Environment : How to Improve and Control External Effects ? . Transport generally has a negative impact on the environment. For example, it constitutes the largest source of noise and contributes to air pollution. These effects are considered to be external when no financial compensation is provided by the parties that generate them. The solution to this problem consists of imposing such compensation and thereby creating an intemalization. However, there are extremely diverse forms of external effects in the same way as there is a wide variety of intemalization devices. . The party responsible for the external effect only pays compensation in the event of a so-called radical intemalization. Non-radical financial intemalization can also be observed, for example, through expenditure to protect against noise. It is therefore the victim who pays, rather than the guilty party. Public transport investments are more often than not intended to reduce external effects such as those associated with congestion. This constitutes a budgetary intemalization paid for by the taxpayer. It follows that appreciable intemalization could be considered to be happening when, for example, awareness of biospheric externalities is raised. . These different forms of intemalization are coming increasingly into play, whether in monetary evaluations of the effects of transport on the environment or in the definition of measures to control such effects. Experts and legislators in Sweden are involved in such an exercise to ensure that the environment is taken into account in the major transport policy arbitration proceedings. The application of these results to goods road haulage in France has provided particularly high evaluations of external costs. [spa] Transportes y medio ambiente Cômo valorizar y dominar los efectos externos ? . Los transportes tienen impactos que son generalmente negativos para el medio ambiente. Por ejemplo, constituyen la fuente de ruido mâs importante. Amedâs, contribuyen a la contaminaciôn del aire. A taies efectos se los llama externos cuando no existe ninguna contrapartida pecuniaria por parte del agente que los provoca. La soluciôn al problema consiste en imponer tal contrapartida, lo que permite reintroducir esos efectos externos en el câleulo econômico del agente concernido, dicho mecanismo se désigna con el nombre de "internalisation". Pero, asî como hay formas muy diversas de efectos externos, hay dispositivos muy diferentes de "internalisation". . El responsable del efecto externo paga solo una contrapartida en el caso de una "internalisation" llamada radical. La "internalisation" pecuniaria no radical, puede también ser observada, por ejemplo, a través de los gastos de protecciôn contra el ruido. El que paga es la vîctima y no el culpable. Las inversiones pûblicas de . transporte son, frecuentemente, destinadas a reabsorber efectos externos como los que estân ligados a los embotellamientos. Se trata enfonces de una "internalisation" presupuestaria pagada por el contribuyente. Por extension, se puede hablar, por ultimo, de "internalisation" sensible cuando, por ejemplo, hay conscientizaciôn de aspectos externos bioesféricos. . Que se trate de evaluar en términos monetarios los efectos de los transportes sobre el medio ambiente o de définir las medidas destinadas a dominarlos, estas formas diferentes de "internalisation" se hallan implicadas sucesivamente. Los exportos y los legisladores se dedicaron a tal ejercicio en Suecia, de manera que el medio ambiente sea tornado en cuenta en los grandes arbitrajes de la polîtica de transporte. Aplicando esos resultados al caso de los transportes de mercancîas por carretera en Francia, se han Ilegado a realizar evaluaciones de costos externos particularmente elevados.

Suggested Citation

  • Alain Bonnafous, 1992. "Transports et environnement," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 258(1), pages 121-128.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_1992_num_258_1_6563
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.1992.6563
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.1992.6563
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3406/estat.1992.6563
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/estat_0336-1454_1992_num_258_1_6563
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3406/estat.1992.6563?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Martin Koning, 2009. "La congestion du boulevard périphérique parisien : Estimations, évolution 2000-2007, discussions," Post-Print halshs-00363389, HAL.
    2. Aurélie Mahieux & Odile Heddebaut, 2013. "Connecting mobility services and spatial territory typology: an application to a former coal mining area in France," Post-Print hal-00909412, HAL.
    3. Pascal Delisle, 1996. "Circulation routière et nuisances environnementales Quelle place pour l'analyse économique ?," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 59(1), pages 135-166.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    2. Qiuyue Xia & Lu Li & Jie Dong & Bin Zhang, 2021. "Reduction Effect and Mechanism Analysis of Carbon Trading Policy on Carbon Emissions from Land Use," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(17), pages 1-22, August.
    3. Frans P. Vries & Nick Hanley, 2016. "Incentive-Based Policy Design for Pollution Control and Biodiversity Conservation: A Review," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(4), pages 687-702, April.
    4. Usher, Dan, 2001. "Personal goods, efficiency and the law," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 673-703, November.
    5. George Tridimas & Stanley L. Winer, 2018. "On the Definition and Nature of Fiscal Coercion," Carleton Economic Papers 18-09, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    6. Mario Jametti & Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, 2005. "Assessing the Efficiency of an Insurance Provider—A Measurement Error Approach," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 30(1), pages 15-34, June.
    7. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 573-585, November.
    8. Stefan Ambec & Yann Kervinio, 2016. "Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 119-155, January.
    9. Liu, Duan & Yu, Nizhou & Wan, Hong, 2022. "Does water rights trading affect corporate investment? The role of resource allocation and risk mitigation channels," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 117(C).
    10. Valcu-Lisman, Adriana & Weninger, Quinn, 2012. "Markov-Perfect rent dissipation in rights-based fisheries," ISU General Staff Papers 201209260700001037, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    11. Hausknost, Daniel & Grima, Nelson & Singh, Simron Jit, 2017. "The political dimensions of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES): Cascade or stairway?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 109-118.
    12. Kurtis Swope & Ryan Wielgus & Pamela Schmitt & John Cadigan, 2011. "Contracts, Behavior, and the Land-assembly Problem: An Experimental Study," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Experiments on Energy, the Environment, and Sustainability, pages 151-180, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    13. Ralph E. Townsend, 2010. "Transactions costs as an obstacle to fisheries self-governance in New Zealand," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 54(3), pages 301-320, July.
    14. Simon Levin & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2021. "On the Coevolution of Economic and Ecological Systems," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 355-377, October.
    15. Whitten, Stuart M. & Salzman, James & Shelton, Dave & Procter, Wendy, 2003. "Markets for ecosystem services: Applying the concepts," 2003 Conference (47th), February 12-14, 2003, Fremantle, Australia 58269, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    16. Rambaud, Alexandre & Richard, Jacques, 2015. "The “Triple Depreciation Line” instead of the “Triple Bottom Line”: Towards a genuine integrated reporting," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 92-116.
    17. Karsten Neuhoff, 2002. "Optimal congestion treatment for bilateral electricity trading," Working Papers EP05, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    18. Maximiliano Marzetti & Rok Spruk, 2023. "Long-Term Economic Effects of Populist Legal Reforms: Evidence from Argentina," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 65(1), pages 60-95, March.
    19. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Accident Law," NBER Working Papers 9483, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_1992_num_258_1_6563. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Equipe PERSEE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/estat .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.