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Pacte de stabilité, crédibilité et stabilisation dans l'union monétaire européenne

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  • Dominique Bureau

Abstract

[fre] Pacte de stabilité, crédibilité et stabilisation dans l'Union monétaire européenne . par Dominique Bureau . Le dilemme entre crédibilité monétaire et stabilisation régionale sous jacent au débat sur les critères budgétaires de l'UEM peut être illustré dans le cadre d'un modèle simple, où le choix d'une banque centrale européenne indépendante est supposé résoudre les problèmes de crédibilité monétaire, mais où les États-membres sont supposés conserver une forte capacité de stabilisation budgétaire face à des chocs de demande. . On montre que dans un tel contexte, l'arbitrage entre la crédibilité anti-inflationniste et la stabilisation des chocs asymétriques est délicat, la banque centrale ne pouvant discipliner simplement le biais expansionniste des autorités budgétaires. La politique monétaire constituant d'une certaine manière un bien public, les autorités nationales ont intérêt à se comporter vis- à- vis de celle-ci en passager clandestin. Dans le modèle considéré, qui met donc au premier plan, non pas les externalités intrinsèques, par les importations ou le taux d'intérêt, entre politiques budgétaires des États-membres, mais celle résultant de l'unicité de la politique monétaire, la mise en place de mécanismes tels que ceux envisagés dans le Pacte de stabilité peut alors être vu comme un instrument complémentaire, visant à alléger ce dilemme crédibilité et stabilisation. Permettant de maintenir l'autonomie des autorités budgétaires, il les responsabiliserait cependant si les sanctions sont perçues comme relativement automatiques. [eng] The Growth and Stability Pact: Stabilisation, Credibility and the EMU Fiscal Criteria . by Dominique Bureau . The monetary credibility versus regional stabilisation dilemma that underlies discussions about EMU fiscal criteria can be illustrated using a simple model, in which opting for an independent European Central Bank is assumed to solve monetary credibility problems, but the Member States are also assumed to maintain a strong capacity for fiscal stabilisation to cope with demand shocks. . We show how, in this context, the trade-off between anti-inflation credibility and stabilisation after asymmetric shocks is a delicate issue, since the central bank does not have a simple means of curbing fiscal authorities' expansionary bias. As monetary policy is a public good in a certain way, national governments should free ride on it. Our model does not highlight the intrinsic externalities between the Member States' fiscal policies through imports or interest rates. Instead it puts the accent on the externality arising from a single monetary policy. This means we can regard the introduction of mechanisms, such as those called for in the Growth and Stability Pact, as an additional instrument aimed at alleviating the credibility/stabilisation dilemma. This would enable fiscal authorities to remain autonomous, but make them accountable, as long as sanctions are perceived as being relatively automatic.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Bureau, 1998. "Pacte de stabilité, crédibilité et stabilisation dans l'union monétaire européenne," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 132(1), pages 49-57.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1998_num_132_1_5897
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.1998.5897
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1998.5897
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