Discretion rather than rules? Outdated optimal commitment plans versus discretionary policymaking
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DOI: 10.1515/bejm-2018-0035
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More about this item
Keywords
commitment; discretion; expectations; policy rules;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
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