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What determines providers' stated preference for the treatment of uncomplicated malaria?

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  • Mangham-Jefferies, Lindsay
  • Hanson, Kara
  • Mbacham, Wilfred
  • Onwujekwe, Obinna
  • Wiseman, Virginia

Abstract

As agents for their patients, providers often make treatment decisions on behalf of patients, and their choices can affect health outcomes. However, providers operate within a network of relationships and are agents not only for their patients, but also other health sector actors, such as their employer, the Ministry of Health, and pharmaceutical suppliers. Providers' stated preferences for the treatment of uncomplicated malaria were examined to determine what factors predict their choice of treatment in the absence of information and institutional constraints, such as the stock of medicines or the patient's ability to pay.

Suggested Citation

  • Mangham-Jefferies, Lindsay & Hanson, Kara & Mbacham, Wilfred & Onwujekwe, Obinna & Wiseman, Virginia, 2014. "What determines providers' stated preference for the treatment of uncomplicated malaria?," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 98-106.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:socmed:v:104:y:2014:i:c:p:98-106
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.12.024
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    References listed on IDEAS

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