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Asymmetric Information and the Demand for Health Care - the Case of Double Moral Hazard

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  • Udo Schneider

    (University of Bayreuth)

Abstract

The production of health does not only depend on the medical services supplied by the physi-cian but is also influenced by the patient’s compliance. A model of medical treatment is pre-sented in which both the actions of physician and patient are modeled as a productive input. The analysis distinguishes between three cases of strategic interaction. The consequences of asymmetric information between physician and patient are lower activity levels, only in the case of strategic substitutes the result might change. Furthermore, the effects of the implementation of a demand-side coinsurance are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Udo Schneider, 2004. "Asymmetric Information and the Demand for Health Care - the Case of Double Moral Hazard," HEW 0409001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwphe:0409001
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    Cited by:

    1. Udo Schneider, 2005. "Asymmetric Information and Outcome-based Compensation in Health Care – Theoretical Implications," HEW 0501006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Schneider, Udo & Zerth, Jürgen, 2008. "Improving prevention compliance through appropriate incentives," MPRA Paper 8280, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Udo Schneider & Volker Ulrich, 2007. "Health Relevant Behavior and its Impact on the Physician-Patient Relationship," Working Papers 023, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    4. Udo Schneider & Volker Ulrich, 2008. "The physician-patient relationship revisited: the patient’s view," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 279-300, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    principal-agent theory; double moral hazard; strategic interaction; compliance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I - Health, Education, and Welfare
    • D - Microeconomics

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