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Von Neuman-Morgenstern, Nash et Arrow-Debreu : théories des jeux et équilibre général

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  • Sylvain Sorin

Abstract

[fre] Cette note vise à préciser, dans une perspective historique, les liens entre la théorie des jeux et la théorie de l'équilibre général. On constate que sous un vocabulaire commun et des outils mathématiques semblables, des approches assez différentes apparaissent dans les travaux de von Neumann-Morgenstern, Nash et Arrow-Debreu. En particulier la notion d'équilibre a un statut très différent dans les deux champs. [eng] The purpose of this note is to make more precise from an historical point of view the connection between game theory and general equilibrium theory. In fact, behind similar terminology and mathematical tools, quite different approaches are used by von Neumann- Morgenstern, Nash and Arrow-Debreu. In particular the equilibrium concept has a very different interpretation in both fields.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvain Sorin, 1999. "Von Neuman-Morgenstern, Nash et Arrow-Debreu : théories des jeux et équilibre général," Cahiers d'Économie Politique, Programme National Persée, vol. 35(1), pages 7-17.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:caecpo:cep_0154-8344_1999_num_35_1_1259
    DOI: 10.3406/cep.1999.1259
    Note: DOI:10.3406/cep.1999.1259
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