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Reading Cournot, Reading Nash: The Creation and Stabilisation of the Nash Equilibrium

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  • Leonard, Robert J

Abstract

The concept of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is central to noncooperative game theory and the latter's use in macroeconomic theory. This paper considers the creation of this theoretical construct, examining the separate contributions of both Cournot and Nash, and showing how the two were ultimately joined together in the eyes of contemporary economic theorists. Rather than simply showing how Cournot served as a precursor to Nash, the author challenges the traditional approach and emphasizes the shifts in interpretation of their respective contributions. In so doing, he addresses some pertinent questions about the manner in which economic theorists view the evolution of their own discipline. Copyright 1994 by Royal Economic Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonard, Robert J, 1994. "Reading Cournot, Reading Nash: The Creation and Stabilisation of the Nash Equilibrium," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(424), pages 492-511, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:104:y:1994:i:424:p:492-511
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    Cited by:

    1. Jorge Streb, 2010. "Hume: The power of abduction and simple observation in economics," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 417, Universidad del CEMA.
    2. R. Myerson, 2010. "Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 6.
    3. Jorge M. Streb, 2015. "Nash’s interpretations of equilibrium: Solving the objections to Cournot," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 575, Universidad del CEMA.
    4. Benoît Lengaigne, 2004. "Nash : changement de programme ?," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 114(5), pages 637-662.
    5. Jorge M. Streb & Gustavo Torrens, 2011. "Meaningful talk," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 443, Universidad del CEMA, revised May 2017.
    6. Luca Lambertini, 2013. "John von Neumann between Physics and Economics: A methodological note," Review of Economic Analysis, Digital Initiatives at the University of Waterloo Library, vol. 5(2), pages 177-189, December.
    7. Jorge M. Streb, 2015. "Nash, el último fundador de la teoría de juegos, y la evolución del concepto de equilibrio desde Cournot," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 572, Universidad del CEMA.
    8. Luca Lambertini & Manuela Mosca, 2014. "The Bertrand Paradox, the Useless Auctioneer and the Launhardt Model," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3-4), pages 170-183, December.
    9. Nils Goldschmidt & Benedikt Szmrecsanyi, 2007. "What Do Economists Talk About? A Linguistic Analysis of Published Writing in Economic Journals," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 335-378, April.
    10. L. Lambertini, 2000. "Quantum Mechanics and Mathematical Economics are Isomorphic. John von Neumann between Physics and Economics," Working Papers 370, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    11. Axel Bernergard & Karl Wärneryd, 2011. "Finite-Population "Mass-Action" and Evolutionary Stability," CESifo Working Paper Series 3378, CESifo.
    12. Committee, Nobel Prize, 1994. "The Work of John Nash in Game Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1994-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
    13. Robert Dimand & Mohammed Dore, 1999. "Cournot, Bertrand, and game theory: A further note," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 27(3), pages 325-333, September.
    14. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998.
    15. Alessandro Innocenti, 2008. "Linking Strategic Interaction and Bargaining Theory: The Harsanyi-Schelling Debate on the Axiom of Symmetry," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 40(1), pages 111-132, Spring.
    16. Ayoubi, Charles & Thurm, Boris, 2020. "Evolution and Heterogeneity of Social Preferences," OSF Preprints ucx8z, Center for Open Science.
    17. Boris Salazar, 2004. "Nash y von Neumann: mundos posibles y juegos de lenguaje," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 6(10), pages 71-94, January-J.
    18. Zhao, Jingang, 2018. "Three little-known and yet still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 592-599.
    19. James W. Friedman, 2000. "The legacy of Augustin Cournot," Cahiers d'Économie Politique, Programme National Persée, vol. 37(1), pages 31-46.
    20. Turan Yay & Huseyin Tastan, 2010. "Invisible Hand in the Process of Making Economics or on the Method and Scope of Economics," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 57(1), pages 61-83, March.
    21. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1994. "The Mass-Action Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium," Working Paper Series 427, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised Aug 1995.
    22. Sylvain Sorin, 1999. "Von Neuman-Morgenstern, Nash et Arrow-Debreu : théories des jeux et équilibre général," Cahiers d'Économie Politique, Programme National Persée, vol. 35(1), pages 7-17.
    23. Lucas, William F., 1995. "The 50th anniversary of TGEB," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 264-268.

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