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Young Children Consider Merit when Sharing Resources with Others

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  • Patricia Kanngiesser
  • Felix Warneken

Abstract

Merit is a key principle of fairness: rewards should be distributed according to how much someone contributed to a task. Previous research suggests that children have an early ability to take merit into account in third-party situations but that merit-based sharing in first-party contexts does not emerge until school-age. Here we provide evidence that three- and five-year-old children already use merit to share resources with others, even when sharing is costly for the child. In Study 1, a child and a puppet-partner collected coins that were later exchanged for rewards. We varied the work-contribution of both partners by manipulating how many coins each partner collected. Children kept fewer stickers in trials in which they had contributed less than in trials in which they had contributed more than the partner, showing that they took merit into account. Few children, however, gave away more than half of the stickers when the partner had worked more. Study 2 confirmed that children related their own work-contribution to their partner’s, rather than simply focusing on their own contribution. Taken together, these studies show that merit-based sharing is apparent in young children; however it remains constrained by a self-serving bias.

Suggested Citation

  • Patricia Kanngiesser & Felix Warneken, 2012. "Young Children Consider Merit when Sharing Resources with Others," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 7(8), pages 1-5, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0043979
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0043979
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Katharina Hamann & Felix Warneken & Julia R. Greenberg & Michael Tomasello, 2011. "Collaboration encourages equal sharing in children but not in chimpanzees," Nature, Nature, vol. 476(7360), pages 328-331, August.
    2. Norman Frohlich & Joe Oppenheimer & Anja Kurki, 2004. "Modeling Other-Regarding Preferences and an Experimental Test," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(1_2), pages 91-117, April.
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    1. Maurizio Pugno, 2021. "The economics of eudaimonia," Chapters, in: Luigino Bruni & Alessandra Smerilli & Dalila De Rosa (ed.), A Modern Guide to the Economics of Happiness, chapter 4, pages 46-66, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Marek Meristo & Luca Surian, 2014. "Infants Distinguish Antisocial Actions Directed towards Fair and Unfair Agents," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(10), pages 1-7, October.
    3. Maria Plötner & Robert Hepach & Harriet Over & Malinda Carpenter & Michael Tomasello, 2021. "Young children share more under time pressure than after a delay," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(3), pages 1-10, March.
    4. N. Gregory Mankiw, 2013. "Defending the One Percent," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 21-34, Summer.
    5. James Stack & Carlos Romero-Rivas, 2020. "Merit overrules theory of mind when young children share resources with others," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(1), pages 1-15, January.
    6. Craig E Smith & Peter R Blake & Paul L Harris, 2013. "I Should but I Won’t: Why Young Children Endorse Norms of Fair Sharing but Do Not Follow Them," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(3), pages 1-11, March.

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