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Differences in Nutrient Requirements Imply a Non-Linear Emergence of Leaders in Animal Groups

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  • Cédric Sueur
  • Jean-Louis Deneubourg
  • Odile Petit
  • Iain D Couzin

Abstract

Collective decision making and especially leadership in groups are among the most studied topics in natural, social, and political sciences. Previous studies have shown that some individuals are more likely to be leaders because of their social power or the pertinent information they possess. One challenge for all group members, however, is to satisfy their needs. In many situations, we do not yet know how individuals within groups distribute leadership decisions between themselves in order to satisfy time-varying individual requirements. To gain insight into this problem, we build a dynamic model where group members have to satisfy different needs but are not aware of each other's needs. Data about needs of animals come from real data observed in macaques. Several studies showed that a collective movement may be initiated by a single individual. This individual may be the dominant one, the oldest one, but also the one having the highest physiological needs. In our model, the individual with the lowest reserve initiates movements and decides for all its conspecifics. This simple rule leads to a viable decision-making system where all individuals may lead the group at one moment and thus suit their requirements. However, a single individual becomes the leader in 38% to 95% of cases and the leadership is unequally (according to an exponential law) distributed according to the heterogeneity of needs in the group. The results showed that this non-linearity emerges when one group member reaches physiological requirements, mainly the nutrient ones – protein, energy and water depending on weight - superior to those of its conspecifics. This amplification may explain why some leaders could appear in animal groups without any despotism, complex signalling, or developed cognitive ability.Author Summary: Making decisions together to reach a consensus is one of the most important challenges of any society. In some communities, however, some leaders have more weight in the decisions than the other individuals. Similar rules exist in animal societies. Studies on animal groups have shown that some individuals are more likely to be leaders because of their social power or the pertinent information they possess. This leader may be the dominant one, the oldest one, but also the one having the highest physiological need. However, how may other group members have their needs satisfied if always the same individual decides? To gain insight into this problem, we build an agent-based model where group members have to satisfy different needs but the individual with the lowest reserve decides when and where to move for all its conspecifics. This simple rule leads to a viable decision-making system that satisfies all individuals and suits their requirements. However, a single individual, the one with the highest needs, becomes the leader in 38% to 95% of cases according to the heterogeneity of needs in the group.

Suggested Citation

  • Cédric Sueur & Jean-Louis Deneubourg & Odile Petit & Iain D Couzin, 2010. "Differences in Nutrient Requirements Imply a Non-Linear Emergence of Leaders in Animal Groups," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(9), pages 1-9, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pcbi00:1000917
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000917
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sean A. Rands & Guy Cowlishaw & Richard A. Pettifor & J. Marcus Rowcliffe & Rufus A. Johnstone, 2003. "Spontaneous emergence of leaders and followers in foraging pairs," Nature, Nature, vol. 423(6938), pages 432-434, May.
    2. Christopher T. Dawes & James H. Fowler & Tim Johnson & Richard McElreath & Oleg Smirnov, 2007. "Egalitarian motives in humans," Nature, Nature, vol. 446(7137), pages 794-796, April.
    3. Iain D. Couzin & Jens Krause & Nigel R. Franks & Simon A. Levin, 2005. "Effective leadership and decision-making in animal groups on the move," Nature, Nature, vol. 433(7025), pages 513-516, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cédric Sueur & Léa Briard & Odile Petit, 2011. "Individual Analyses of Lévy Walk in Semi-Free Ranging Tonkean Macaques (Macaca tonkeana)," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(10), pages 1-8, October.
    2. Sean A Rands, 2011. "The Effects of Dominance on Leadership and Energetic Gain: A Dynamic Game between Pairs of Social Foragers," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 7(10), pages 1-10, October.

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