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International Business Research and Game Theory: Looking beyond the Prisoner's Dilemma

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  • Ott, Ursula F.

Abstract

This article outlines the un-mined potential of Game Theory for International Business (IB) research. Game Theory has been only rarely used in International Business – particularly, in comparison to transaction cost economics and the resource based view. Although its applications to International Business problems do exist, there is considerably more potential for its refinements to be related to topics of uncertainty and dynamics in strategic interactions in International Business. There is more to Game Theory than the Prisoner's Dilemma.

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  • Ott, Ursula F., 2013. "International Business Research and Game Theory: Looking beyond the Prisoner's Dilemma," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 480-491.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:iburev:v:22:y:2013:i:2:p:480-491
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ibusrev.2012.07.004
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    Cited by:

    1. Ursula F Ott & Pervez N Ghauri, 2019. "Brexit negotiations: From negotiation space to agreement zones," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 50(1), pages 137-149, February.
    2. Taotao Chen & Afonso Fleury & Maria Tereza Fleury & Xiao Chen, 2020. "Government, MNEs and Industry Development: A Perspective of Game Theory," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 19(1), pages 1-26, June.

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