International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy
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- Staiger, Robert W., 1995. "International rules and institutions for trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 29, pages 1495-1551, Elsevier.
- Staiger, Robert W., 1994. "International Rules And Institutions For Trade Policy," SSRI Workshop Series 292708, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute.
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JEL classification:
- F1 - International Economics - - Trade
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