IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/nea/journl/y2014i22p12-40.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Psychological Games in the Theory of Choice. II. Shame, Regret, Egoism and Altruism

Author

Listed:
  • Zak, F.

    (Central Economics Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

In this paper we give a survey of recent works on game theory devoted to modeling of decision making process under bounded rationality. An agent's deviation from rational choice understood as maximization of gain can be caused by moral principles (religious beliefs, altruism, patriotism), emotions (envy, wrath, shame, regret, or guilt) or simply by an attempt to comply with several estimation criteria not reducible to a single one. In the second part of the survey we consider the behavior of agents subject to shame and regret, egoists and altruists, and study bargaining solutions in multicriteria settings.

Suggested Citation

  • Zak, F., 2014. "Psychological Games in the Theory of Choice. II. Shame, Regret, Egoism and Altruism," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 22(2), pages 12-40.
    • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2014:i:22:p:12-40
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econorus.org/repec/journl/2014-22-12-40r.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Simonson, Itamar, 1989. "Choice Based on Reasons: The Case of Attraction and Compromise Effects," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 16(2), pages 158-174, September.
    2. Edward P. Lazear & Ulrike Malmendier & Roberto A. Weber, 2012. "Sorting in Experiments with Application to Social Preferences," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 136-163, January.
    3. Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman & Aldo Rustichini, 2009. "Temptation-Driven Preferences," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(3), pages 937-971.
    4. , & ,, 2012. "Reason-based choice: a bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(1), January.
    5. Zak, F., 2014. "Psychological Games in the Theory of Choice: Temptation, Perfectionism, Self-deception," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 12-32.
    6. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(3), pages 817-869.
    7. Sprumont, Y., 1991. "Intermediate Preferences And Rawlsian Arbitration Rules," Cahiers de recherche 9113, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    8. Todd Sarver, 2008. "Anticipating Regret: Why Fewer Options May Be Better," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(2), pages 263-305, March.
    9. Nejat Anbarci, 2006. "Finite Alternating-Move Arbitration Schemes and the Equal Area Solution," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 21-50, August.
    10. David Dillenberger & Philipp Sadowski, 2008. "Ashamed to be Selfish," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-037, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    11. Broberg, Tomas & Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2007. "Is generosity involuntary?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 32-37, January.
    12. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2001. "Temptation and Self-Control," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1403-1435, November.
    13. , & ,, 2012. "Ashamed to be selfish," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(1), January.
    14. Eddie Dekel & Barton L Lipman & Aldo Rustichini & Todd Sarver, 2007. "Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space: A Corrigendum -super-1," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(2), pages 591-600, March.
    15. Dana, Jason & Cain, Daylian M. & Dawes, Robyn M., 2006. "What you don't know won't hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 193-201, July.
    16. James Andreoni & John Miller, 2002. "Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 737-753, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Danilov, V., 2015. "Beyond Classical Rationality: Two-Stage Rationalization," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 26(2), pages 12-35.
    2. Zak, F., 2021. "On some models of altruistic behavior," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 49(1), pages 12-52.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Riella, Gil, 2013. "Preference for Flexibility and Dynamic Consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2467-2482.
    2. Saito, Kota, 2015. "Impure altruism and impure selfishness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 336-370.
    3. Noor, Jawwad & Ren, Linxia, 2023. "Temptation and guilt," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 272-295.
    4. Fabio Galeotti & Maria Montero & Anders Poulsen, 2022. "The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(4), pages 2987-3007, April.
    5. Gorno, Leandro, 2016. "Additive representation for preferences over menus in finite choice settings," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 41-47.
    6. Leandro Gorno, 2010. "Additive representation for preferences over menus in finite choice settings," Working Papers 1292, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    7. Name-Correa, Alvaro J. & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2016. "“Giving” in to social pressure," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 99-116.
    8. Breitmoser, Yves & Vorjohann, Pauline, 2018. "Welfare-Based Altruism," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 89, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    9. Breitmoser, Yves & Vorjohann, Pauline, 2022. "Fairness-based Altruism," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 666, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    10. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus & Mollerstrom, Johanna & Munkhammar, Sara, 2012. "Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 117-130.
    11. Carpenter, Jeffrey & Robbett, Andrea, 2024. "Measuring socially appropriate social preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 517-532.
    12. Zachary Grossman, 2014. "Strategic Ignorance and the Robustness of Social Preferences," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(11), pages 2659-2665, November.
    13. Dillenberger, David & Sadowski, Philipp, 2008. "Ashamed to be Selfish," MPRA Paper 8343, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Engel, Christoph & Goerg, Sebastian J., 2018. "If the worst comes to the worst: Dictator giving when recipient’s endowments are risky," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 51-70.
    15. Nobuo Koida, 2018. "Anticipated stochastic choice," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(3), pages 545-574, May.
    16. Honda, Edward, 2021. "Sophistication and preference inconsistency in a menu utility representation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 116-121.
    17. Youichiro Higashi & Kazuya Hyogo & Gil Riella, 2020. "Dynamically Consistent Menu Preferences," KIER Working Papers 1047, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    18. Masatlioglu, Yusufcan & Nakajima, Daisuke & Ozdenoren, Emre, 2020. "Willpower and compromise effect," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
    19. Noor, Jawwad & Takeoka, Norio, 2015. "Menu-dependent self-control," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 1-20.
    20. Ortoleva, Pietro, 2013. "The price of flexibility: Towards a theory of Thinking Aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 903-934.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    binary preference relation; utility function; two-period choice model; set betweenness axiom; shame; regret; egoism; altruism; attraction; compromise; fallback bargaining;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2014:i:22:p:12-40. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alexey Tcharykov (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nearuea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.