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The social cost of lobbying over climate policy

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  • Kyle C. Meng

    (University of California
    National Bureau of Economic Research)

  • Ashwin Rode

    (University of Chicago)

Abstract

Domestic political processes shape climate policy. In particular, there is increasing concern about the role of political lobbying over climate policy. This paper examines how lobbying spending on the Waxman–Markey bill, the most prominent and promising United States climate regulation so far, altered its likelihood of being implemented. We combine data from comprehensive United States lobbying records with an empirical method for forecasting the policy’s effect on the value of publicly listed firms. Our statistical analysis suggests that lobbying by firms expecting losses from the policy was more effective than lobbying by firms expecting gains. Interpreting this finding through a game-theoretic model, we calculate that lobbying lowered the probability of enacting the Waxman–Markey bill by 13 percentage points, representing an expected social cost of US$60 billion (in 2018 US dollars). Our findings also suggest how future climate policy proposals can be designed to be more robust to political opposition.

Suggested Citation

  • Kyle C. Meng & Ashwin Rode, 2019. "The social cost of lobbying over climate policy," Nature Climate Change, Nature, vol. 9(6), pages 472-476, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:nat:natcli:v:9:y:2019:i:6:d:10.1038_s41558-019-0489-6
    DOI: 10.1038/s41558-019-0489-6
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Réka Juhász & Nathan Lane, 2024. "The Political Economy of Industrial Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 11143, CESifo.
    2. Kristian S. Nielsen & Kimberly A. Nicholas & Felix Creutzig & Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stern, 2021. "The role of high-socioeconomic-status people in locking in or rapidly reducing energy-driven greenhouse gas emissions," Nature Energy, Nature, vol. 6(11), pages 1011-1016, November.
    3. Thieme, Sebastian, 2024. "(When) are Lobbying Expenditures a Good Proxy for Lobbying Activity?," IAST Working Papers 24-160, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    4. Yali Yi & Pelin Demirel, 2023. "The impact of sustainability‐oriented dynamic capabilities on firm growth: Investigating the green supply chain management and green political capabilities," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(8), pages 5873-5888, December.
    5. Shafiullah, Muhammad & Miah, Mohammad Dulal & Alam, Md Samsul & Atif, Muhammad, 2021. "Does economic policy uncertainty affect renewable energy consumption?," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 1500-1521.
    6. Sterner, Thomas & Ewald, Jens & Sterner, Erik, 2024. "Economists and the climate," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    7. Olimpia Cutinelli Rendina & Sonja Dobkowitz & Antoine Mayerowitz, 2024. "Environmentally-Responsible Demand: Irresponsible Lobbying? ," Post-Print hal-04502992, HAL.
    8. Masakazu Ogami, 2024. "The Conditionality of Political Short‐Termism: A Review of Empirical and Experimental Studies," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 12.
    9. Choi, Pak-Sing & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix, 2024. "Environmental regulation under sequential competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 221(C), pages 52-72.
    10. Srivastav, Sugandha & Rafaty, Ryan, 2021. "Five Worlds of Political Strategy in the Climate Movement," INET Oxford Working Papers 2021-07, Institute for New Economic Thinking at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.
    11. Rafaty, R. & Dolphin, G. & Pretis, F., 2020. "Carbon pricing and the elasticity of CO2 emissions," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 20116, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    12. Renae Marshall & Matthew G. Burgess, 2022. "Advancing bipartisan decarbonization policies: lessons from state-level successes and failures," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 171(1), pages 1-22, March.
    13. Kakuho Furukawa & Hibiki Ichiue & Noriyuki Shiraki, 2020. "How Does Climate Change Interact with the Financial System? A Survey," Bank of Japan Working Paper Series 20-E-8, Bank of Japan.
    14. Teun Schrieks & Julia Swart & Fujin Zhou & W. J. Wouter Botzen, 2023. "Lobbying, Time Preferences and Emission Tax Policy," Economics of Disasters and Climate Change, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 1-32, March.
    15. Hennicke, Moritz & Blanga-Gubbay, Michael, 2023. "Betting on the Wrong Horse: Lobbying on TPP and the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election," OSF Preprints zcwsn, Center for Open Science.
    16. Achim Hagen & Karen Pittel, 2021. "Chancen und Risiken klimapolitischer Langfriststrategien am Beispiel des deutschen Klimaschutzgesetzes," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 101(5), pages 334-338, May.

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