IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v221y2024icp52-72.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Environmental regulation under sequential competition

Author

Listed:
  • Choi, Pak-Sing
  • Espinola-Arredondo, Ana
  • Munoz-Garcia, Felix

Abstract

We examine a polluting industry, competing à la Stackelberg, facing emission fees. We evaluate the leader's output advantage, disentangling two effects: the first-mover and cost advantage. We show that environmental regulation decreases the leader's output advantage; a reduction that is emphasized when pollution is more severe, but ameliorated by the leader's cost efficiency. We also measure the fee and welfare inefficiency arising if the regulator incorrectly assumes that the industry competes simultaneously, identifying in which settings this inefficiency is the largest. Our extensions consider investment in abatement, several leaders and followers, firm-specific emission fees, differentiated products, and a follower's cost advantage.

Suggested Citation

  • Choi, Pak-Sing & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix, 2024. "Environmental regulation under sequential competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 221(C), pages 52-72.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:221:y:2024:i:c:p:52-72
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.03.014
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268124001069
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.03.014?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aleix Calveras & Juan‐José Ganuza, 2016. "The Role of Public Information in Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 990-1017, December.
    2. Coria, Jessica & Hennlock, Magnus & Sterner, Thomas, 2021. "Interjurisdictional externalities, overlapping policies and NOx pollution control in Sweden," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    3. Halkos, George & Papageorgiou, George, 2014. "Controlling polluting firms: Nash and Stackelberg strategies," MPRA Paper 58947, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Halkos, George, 2008. "A Stackelberg Model on Taxing Polluting Firms," MPRA Paper 23741, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. David P. Baron, 2001. "Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(1), pages 7-45, March.
    6. Kurtyka, Oliwia & Mahenc, Philippe, 2011. "The switching effect of environmental taxation within Bertrand differentiated duopoly," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 267-277, September.
    7. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1992. "Environmental policy design and dynamic nonpoint-source pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 22-39, July.
    8. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal & Qing Xu, 2001. "Price competition, pollution, and environmental policy in an open economy," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 35(1), pages 59-79.
    9. Kyle C. Meng & Ashwin Rode, 2019. "The social cost of lobbying over climate policy," Nature Climate Change, Nature, vol. 9(6), pages 472-476, June.
    10. Ryle S. Perera, 2022. "A Stackelberg–Nash–Cournot Equilibrium in a Pollution Reduction Scheme," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 24(02), pages 1-23, June.
    11. Levin, Dan, 1985. "Taxation within Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 281-290, August.
    12. Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
    13. Baron, David P., 2008. "Managerial contracting and corporate social responsibility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1-2), pages 268-288, February.
    14. R. Simpson, 1995. "Optimal pollution taxation in a Cournot duopoly," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 6(4), pages 359-369, December.
    15. Vandoros, Sotiris & Carman, Katherine Grace, 2011. "Demand and pricing of preventative healthcare," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 37159, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    16. Till Requate, 2005. "Timing and Commitment of Environmental Policy, Adoption of New Technology, and Repercussions on R&D," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(2), pages 175-199, June.
    17. Peter Michaelis & Thomas Ziesemer, 2010. "Policy Diffusion in a simple Stackelberg Game," Discussion Paper Series 314, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics.
    18. Farzin, Y H, 2003. "The Effects of Emissions Standards on Industry," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 315-327, November.
    19. Muñoz-García Félix & Akhundjanov Sherzod B., 2016. "Can Polluting Firms Favor Regulation?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(4), pages 1-23, October.
    20. Emmanuel Petrakis & Anastasios Xepapadeas, "undated". "To Commit or Not to Commit: Environmental Policy In Imperfectly Competitive Markets," Working Papers 0110, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Xiaohuan Li & Chenggang Wang & Dongrong Li & Dongxue Yang & Fan Meng & Yuan Huang, 2024. "Environmental Regulations, Green Marketing, and Consumers’ Green Product Purchasing Intention: Evidence from China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(20), pages 1-24, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fischer, Carolyn, 2011. "Market power and output-based refunding of environmental policy revenues," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 212-230, January.
    2. Buccella, Domenico & Fanti, Luciano & Gori, Luca, 2024. "Corporate Social Responsibility: A theory of the firm revisited with environmental issues," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1421, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    3. Bocar Samba Ba, 2016. "Phosphorus conservation, eutrophication reduction and social welfare improvement: taxation of extracted phosphorus or subsidy of recycled phosphorus ?," Post-Print hal-02801273, HAL.
    4. Requate, Till, 2005. "Environmental Policy under Imperfect Competition: A Survey," Economics Working Papers 2005-12, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
    5. Marc St‐Pierre & Aaron A. Elrod, 2022. "The perverse effect of environmental regulation on emissions: The role of product‐mix changes," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(1), pages 197-235, February.
    6. Ba, Bocar Samba & Combes-Motel, Pascale & Schwartz, Sonia, 2020. "Challenging pollution and the balance problem from rare earth extraction: how recycling and environmental taxation matter," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(6), pages 634-656, December.
    7. Xu, Lili & Cho, Sumi & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2016. "Emission tax and optimal privatization in Cournot–Bertrand comparison," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 73-82.
    8. Bárcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos & Campo, María Luz, 2017. "Taxes versus standards under cross-ownership," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 36-50.
    9. Lahiri, Sajal & Ono, Yoshiyasu, 2015. "Pollution, foreign direct investment, and welfare," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 238-247.
    10. Lisa Planer-Friedrich & Marco Sahm, 2020. "Strategic corporate social responsibility, imperfect competition, and market concentration," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 79-101, January.
    11. Ino, Hiroaki & Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2021. "Optimality of emission pricing policies based on emission intensity targets under imperfect competition," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    12. Carrión-Flores, Carmen E. & Innes, Robert, 2010. "Environmental innovation and environmental performance," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 27-42, January.
    13. Aseem Kaul & Jiao Luo, 2018. "An economic case for CSR: The comparative efficiency of for‐profit firms in meeting consumer demand for social goods," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(6), pages 1650-1677, June.
    14. Petrakis, Emmanuel & Xepapadeas, Anastasios, 2003. "Location decisions of a polluting firm and the time consistency of environmental policy," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 197-214, May.
    15. Claudia Ranocchia & Luca Lambertini, 2021. "Porter Hypothesis vs Pollution Haven Hypothesis: Can There Be Environmental Policies Getting Two Eggs in One Basket?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 78(1), pages 177-199, January.
    16. Joanna Poyago-Thotoky, 2003. "Optimal Environmental Taxation, R&D Subsidization and the Role of Market Conduct," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 15-26, Spring.
    17. Erin T. Mansur, 2007. "Do Oligopolists Pollute Less? Evidence From A Restructured Electricity Market," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 661-689, December.
    18. Lambert Schoonbeek & Frans Vries, 2009. "Environmental taxes and industry monopolization," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 94-106, August.
    19. Adriana Gama, 2020. "Standards and social welfare in Cournot oligopolies," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 22(3), pages 467-483, July.
    20. Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2013. "Certification of corporate social responsibility activities in oligopolistic markets," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 46(1), pages 282-309, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Stackelberg competition; Pollution; Cournot competition; Cost asymmetry; Output advantage; Environmental regulation; Emission fees;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:221:y:2024:i:c:p:52-72. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.