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Property Rights Versus Rent-Seeking Politics: A Public Choice Perspective

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  • Jennis J. Biser

Abstract

Classroom discussion of political topics, if done in a way that encourages lively but healthy debate, can encourage student participation and critical thinking. This paper outlines several insights from public choice research as applied to the federal government set up by the U.S. Constitution and the protection of property rights. Using a Hobbes versus Locke framework, this discussion also encourages debate about the role of government generally. The interdisciplinary nature of the discussion encourages input from students majoring in various fields, making this framework particularly well suited to use in an upper division elective with limited pre-requisite courses.

Suggested Citation

  • Jennis J. Biser, 2017. "Property Rights Versus Rent-Seeking Politics: A Public Choice Perspective," Journal for Economic Educators, Middle Tennessee State University, Business and Economic Research Center, vol. 17(2), pages 1-17, Fall.
  • Handle: RePEc:mts:jrnlee:v:17:y:2017:i:2:p:1-17
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    File URL: http://capone.mtsu.edu/jee/2017/pp1-17MS716final.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Property Rights; Takings; Eminent Domain; Public Choice; US Constitution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H13 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Economics of Eminent Domain; Expropriation; Nationalization
    • K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
    • N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913

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