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Der deutsche Taximarkt – das letzte (Kollektiv-)Monopol im Sturm der „neuen Zeit“

Author

Listed:
  • Pape Annika

    (Hochschulrektorenkonferenz, Projekt nexus – Übergänge gestalten, Studienerfolg verbessern, Ahrtraße 39, 53175 Bonn)

  • Wein Thomas

    (Leuphana University of Lueneburg, Institute of Economics, Competition and Regulation Institute, Scharnhorststraße 1, 21335 Lüneburg)

Abstract

Smartphone-Apps and web-based tools improve the transparency of taxi rides with regard to prices and routing. These technical innovations reduce asymmetric information. Hence, obligatory knowledge tests of streets and important places are no longer necessary. However, the provision of taxis may yield a waiting externality. Empirically the regulator takes the costs, structures into account and, therefore, acts for the purpose of public interests. Nonetheless, the population variable seems questionable. The reasons for the puzzling results might refer to different perceptions with regard to waiting time in sparsely populated areas.

Suggested Citation

  • Pape Annika & Wein Thomas, 2015. "Der deutsche Taximarkt – das letzte (Kollektiv-)Monopol im Sturm der „neuen Zeit“," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 64(3), pages 362-392, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:64:y:2015:i:3:p:362-392
    DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2015-0308
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    3. Pio Baake & Vanessa von Schlippenbach, 2014. "Taximarkt: kein Markt für eine vollständige Liberalisierung," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 81(31/32), pages 751-755.
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    Cited by:

    1. Haucap, Justus, 2018. "Big Data aus wettbewerbs- und ordnungspolitischer Perspektive," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 96, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    2. Haucap, Justus & Heimeshoff, Ulrich, 2017. "Ordnungspolitik in der digitalen Welt," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 90, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).

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